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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA): is a federal statute that is intended to 
encourage depository institutions to help meet the credit needs of the communities 
in which they operate, including low- and moderate-income (LMI) neighborhoods, 
consistent with safe and sound operations. It was enacted by the Congress in 1977 
(12 U.S.C. 2901) and is implemented by Regulation BB (12 CFR 228). 
Community Reinvestment: is the term used by ANHD and others to describe 
all banking activities including lending, investment, and services that have a com-
munity development purpose.   
Community Development: is the range of activities such as affordable housing 
(including multifamily rental housing) for LMI individuals, community services 
targeted to LMI individuals, initiatives that promote economic development by 
financing businesses or farms that meet the size eligibility standards of the Small 
Business Administration, or activities that revitalize or stabilize LMI geographies.
Community Development Lending: loans to borrowers for affordable hous-
ing rehabilitation and construction, neighborhood revitalization, small business 
development, and job creation initiatives as well as loans to community loan funds 
and not-for-profit organizations that serve primarily LMI households. 
Multi-Family Lending: loans, either originations or re-financings, to individual 
landlords or investors of multi-family properties, such as an apartment building 
with five or more units. 
Home Purchase Lending: loans extended to consumers by financial institu-
tions to be used towards the purchase of an owner-occupied home.
CRA-qualified Investment: is a lawful investment, deposit, membership share, 
or grant that has as its primary purpose community development. For example, 
banks may purchase state and local government bonds that fund the construction 
or rehabilitation of affordable housing.
CRA-related Philanthropy: the provision of grants for general operating and 
program-specific support, and sponsorship of fundraising galas, conferences, and 
community education events in the communities in which they do business.
        :       
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Census Tract: Census tracts are small, relatively permanent statistical subdivi-
sions of a county. Census tracts are delineated for most metropolitan areas and 
other densely populated counties by local census statistical areas committees fol-
lowing Census Bureau guidelines.
Deposit Base: the amount of money a bank holds from customers who are look-
ing for safekeeping or to gain interest.
Tier 1 Capital: Tier 1 Capital is the core measure of a bank’s financial strength 
from a regulatory perspective. It is a core indicator of a banks strength and ability 
to absorb losses. Tier 1 Capital is composed of core capital, which consists primar-
ily of common stock and disclosed reserves.
Low Income: an individual whose income is less than 50 % of the area median 
income (AMI). In the New York Metropolitan Area, this equals $30,800.
Moderate Income: an individual whose income is between 50 - 80% of the area 
median income (AMI). In New York City, this equals between $30,800 and $49,280.
Lending Test: The part of a CRA exam that evaluates a bank’s record of help-
ing to meet the credit needs of its assessment area through its lending activities 
by considering a bank’s home mortgage, small business, farm, and community 
development lending.
Investment Test: The part of a CRA exam that evaluates a bank’s record of help-
ing to meet the credit needs of its assessment area through qualified investments 
and grants that benefit its assessment area or a broader statewide or regional area 
that includes the bank’s assessment area.
Service Test: The part of a CRA exam that evaluates a bank’s record of helping 
to meet the credit needs of its assessment area by analyzing the availability and 
effectiveness of a bank’s systems for delivering retail services and the extent and 
innovativeness of its community development services.
 
Sources: Definitions related to CRA available 
at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/community-
dev/cra_about.htm, www.frbsf.org/community/
craresources/CRA101JO.ppt;  
and http://www.ffiec.gov/cra; Regulation BB 
Community Reinvestment, Section 228.12(s). 
Census tract information available at: http://
www.census.gov/geo/www/cen_tract.html;  
Area Median Income data available at: http://
www.nyhomes.org/assets/documents/3660.
pdf.  
Information about CRA exam available at:  
http://www.occ.gov 
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Passed in 1977 in response to the devastating impact that redlining and disin-
vestment had on urban areas, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) states 
that banks have an affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs of low- 
and moderate-income (LMI)1 residents and neighborhoods in a safe and sound 
manner. This obligation stems from the banks being publicly chartered, receiv-
ing low-cost deposit insurance and having access to inexpensive credit from the 
Federal Reserve Bank’s discount window. Spurred by the CRA, banks 
have played a critical role in helping to build wealth for households and 
revitalizing many neighborhoods across the city through their support 
of community development efforts and providing access to capital.  
In last year’s “State of Bank Reinvestment in New York City” report, the 
Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development (ANHD) pre-
sented data received from the city’s largest financial institutions that 
documented substantial reductions in their core CRA-related activities 
such as community development and multi-family lending. Analysis of 
the most current data from 20 of the city’s largest financial institutions 
demonstrates that these trends have continued while banks, for the first 
time, have also cut home mortgage lending, CRA-qualified investments and phi-
lanthropy. These reductions, summarized in Finding 1 and Appendix A, come 
amidst often substantial profits and growing deposits. 
While most financial institutions have argued that the recession and economic un-
certainty contributed to the drop in their CRA–related activities, the truth is most 
banks had strong financials—the direct result of taxpayer-funded bailouts—and the 
public sector in New York City had either maintained or expanded its investment in 
community and economic development. Thus, the fact that many banks were and are 
doing less to meet the credit needs of local communities amidst growing profits and 
deposits challenges their rationale that the reductions resulted from the recession, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1 For the purpose of CRA, “Low” income is defined 
as a household earning 50% of the Area Median 
Income (AMI) and “Moderate” income represents 
households earning up to 80% AMI. See joint rule 
promulgated by the Comptroller of the Currency:  
12 C.F.R. §§  25.12(h)(2) 
Available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/fr/
cfrparts/12cfr25.htm. 
 Despite record 
profits and grow-
ing deposits, all 20 
banks we analyzed 
reduced their lend-
ing, investment 
and/ or services.
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and violates the spirit of the CRA. 
Regulators and elected officials 
must question why LMI commu-
nities have been hit hardest, hold 
culpable institutions accountable 
and encourage all banks to reverse 
these trends. 
Furthermore, the reductions—con-
siderable in their own right—are 
particularly skewed toward low- 
and moderate-income communi-
ties and borrowers. As Finding 2 
details, there is compelling evi-
dence that poorer neighborhoods 
and borrowers bore a dispropor-
tionate share of the reductions. 
The final major finding shows that commercial, savings, and wholesale banks take different 
approaches to reinvestment. Savings banks, which tend to be smaller and more locally rooted, 
dedicated a larger share of their deposits to core reinvestment activities such as multi-family 
lending, community development lending, and CRA-qualified investment in 2009 than com-
mercial or wholesale banks. That being said, all banks commit a miniscule amount—often a 
fraction of one percent—to reinvestment activities. For several key indicators, savings banks 
also exhibited better year-over-year performance than their commercial and wholesale bank 
counterparts. This is likely a result of savings banks being less involved in originating, securi-
tizing and investing in subprime mortgage loans and therefore possessing a stronger balance 
sheet.
FINDING 1
Despite sizeable profits and growing deposits, most of New York City’s largest banks 
substantially decreased lending, investment and services in 2009. 
The majority of New York City banks continue to add to their deposit base. Indeed, 64.7% 
of the banks we analyzed saw growth between 2008 and 2009. As Table 1 demonstrates, 
overall deposits for the city’s largest banks rose by $38.5 billion (+8.6%) between 2008 and 
2009. The largest increases were achieved by wholesale banks such as Bank of New York 
REINVESTMENT is the term used by ANHD and others to describe  
all banking activities including lending, investment, and services  
that have a community development purpose. 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT LENDING is defined as loans to 
borrowers, both for-profit and non-profit organizations, for affordable 
housing rehabilitation and construction, neighborhood revitalization, 
small business development, and job creation initiatives.
MULTI-FAMILY LENDING means loans, either originations or  
re-financings, to individual landlords or investors of multi-family  
properties, such as an apartment building with five or more units.  
CRA-QUALIFIED INVESTMENT is a lawful investment, deposit,  
membership share, or grant that has as its primary purpose  
community development. 
TOTAL DEPOSITS FOR 15 of  
NYC’s LARGEST BANKS (billions)
$446.38 b $484.89 b 8.6%
2008 2009 % CHANGE 
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Mellon and Deutsche Bank, though Capital One, TD Bank, Valley National, Santander/ 
Sovereign, and New York Community Bank also experienced growth. 
In addition to a larger deposit base, the banking industry also experienced a substantial 
increase in profitability in 2009 compared to the previous year. In 2009, the banking in-
dustry in New York City generated $70.8 billion in profits, a 82.6% increase from the $38.8 
billion in 2008. Individual banks doing business in the city were extremely profitable too. 
For example, 81% (17 banks) of the institutions we analyzed posted a profit in 2009, which 
averaged $3.37 billion. Goldman Sachs ($13.4 billion), Santander/ Sovereign ($12.6 bil-
lion), and JPMorgan Chase ($11.7 billion) led all banks in terms of profits. Four banks lost 
money in 2009. And there does not appear to be any correlation between those institutions 
that lost money and those that authorized the greatest reductions in lending, investment, 
and services.
Despite these gains, the industry as a whole deployed less capital in New York City in 
every major category of lending and investment. For example, there was a:
•  42.9% decrease in Home Purchase Lending  
(from $7.0 billion to $4 billion)
•  36.9% decrease in Community Development Lending  
(from $2.2 billion to $1.4 billion)
•  13.6% decrease in Multi-Family Lending 
(from $2.3 billion to $2.0 billion)
•  36.5% decrease in CRA-qualified Investment  
(from $818.8 million to $520.1 million)
•  4.7% decrease in CRA-eligible Philanthropy  
(from $37.4 million to $35.6 million)
This trend of banks doing less to meet the credit needs of low-and moderate-income com-
munities amidst large profits and growing customer deposits is indefensible. Banks must 
establish policies that link increased capital with expanded reinvestment, and regulators 
must penalize any bank that does not meet this basic standard.  
FINDING 2
Banks reduced their reinvestment activities in low- and moderate-in-
come communities at a greater level than the city overall.
In addition to conducting an analysis on how banks are serving the city 
as a whole, ANHD examined how banks serve particular constituencies, 
like LMI communities and borrowers.  Given the historical underpin-
nings of redlining, we believe it is important that banks demonstrate 
penetration across their assessment area and particularly in working 
class neighborhoods. Unfortunately, for several key activities, we found that banks were 
targeting the deepest reductions in communities most in need. ANHD recognizes that 
    Banks reduced their 
reinvestment activities 
in low- and moderate-
income communities 
at a greater level than 
the city overall.
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outside factors—like the great recession—may impact somewhat a bank’s ability 
to reinvest at a level we think is sufficient. What we consider indefensible, how-
ever, is when banks choose to concentrate these reductions in poor neighborhoods 
and deny loans to working class, credit-worthy borrowers. 
MULTI-FAMILY LENDING
In 2009, 13 banks originated 447 multi-family mortgage loans 
compared to 709 in the previous year, which is a reduction 
of 36.95% (see Table 2). However, in terms of the number of 
multi-family loans in low- or moderate-income tracts, there 
was a decrease of 57.8% (163 loans compared to 386).  In 
terms of the dollar amount of multi-family lending during this 
period, 14 banks reported $2.01 billion in multi-family lend-
ing compared to $2.32 billion in 2008, which is a reduction of 
13.6%. Comparing this to the multi-family loans made specif-
ically in low- and moderate-income census tracts, which saw 
a 48.4% reduction, it is evident that poorer communities bore 
a larger proportion of the reductions than the city as a whole 
($507.2 million in 2009 compared to $983.3 million in 2008). 
HOME PURCHASE LENDING
In 2009, 11 of the city’s largest mortgage bankers originated 
12,834 home purchase loans compared to 20,519 in 2008—a 
reduction of 37.5%. In terms of the dollar amount of those 
mortgage loans, there was an even steeper reduction of 
42.9% (from $7.0 billion to $4 billion). These are substantial, 
distressing reductions and ones that banks must explain. 
Many ANHD members have reported great difficulty obtain-
ing mortgage loans for potential buyers in their new con-
struction projects. In many cases, the bank that provided the 
construction loan was unwilling to help first-time homebuy-
ers move into the finished complex. This underscores how 
tight the credit market became despite qualified borrowers 
and new business opportunities. 
Unfortunately, policy proposals under consideration by the 
federal regulators may exacerbate this situation. In response 
to “risk retention” requirements laid out in The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, federal regulators have proposed exempt-
ing financial institutions from these requirements if they issue loans, known as 
Qualified Residential Mortgages (QRM), that contain terms and conditions that 
are thought to make them less likely to enter default.2 Because high down pay-
ment requirements are one criteria in QRMs, homeownership—especially in high 
2 National Community Reinvestment Coalition 
“2011 Policy Priorities.”  
Available at: www.ncrc.org. 
 REDUCTIONS IN MULTI-FAMILY LENDING:  
CITY vs. LMI TRACTS   2008-2009
% CHANGE in number of  
Multi-Family Loans in NYC
% CHANGE in number of  
Multi-Family Loans in NYC 
in LMI Tracts
% CHANGE in dollar amount 
of Multi-Family Loans in 
NYC
% CHANGE in dollar amount 
of Multi-Family Loans in 
NYC in LMI Tracts
-36.95%
-57.8 %
-13.6%
-48.4%
Table 2.
HOME PURCHASE LOANS TO ALL BORROWERS 
vs. LMI BORROWERS   2008-2009
% CHANGE in number  
of Home Purchase Loans:  
all borrowers  
% CHANGE in number  
of Home Purchase Loans:  
LMI Borrowers
% CHANGE in dollar amount 
of Home Purchase Loans:  
all borrowers
% CHANGE in dollar amount 
of  Home Purchase Loans: 
LMI Borrowers
-37.5%
-63 %
-42.9%
-88.6%
Table 3.
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cost cities like New York—will be out of reach for all but the wealthiest borrowers. 
ANHD believes regulators must reconsider these steep down payment require-
ments to avoid even further reductions in mortgage lending.   
Again, however, the reduced volume is not the same across all borrowers. Between 
2008 and 2009, banks reduced the number and dollar amount of home purchase 
loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers by 95.1% and 86.4% respectively 
(see Table 3). These reductions grossly outweigh the drop in new home purchase 
loans to all borrowers across the city. 
An even more stunning statistic is that the city’s banks made just 132 mortgage 
loans to low-income borrowers (totaling $7.34 million) in 2009, which is a decline 
of over 70%. While banks are likely to defend this as a function of the foreclosure 
crisis and the risk associated with lending to low-income homebuyers, it has been 
widely documented that first-time homebuyers who have completed pre-purchase 
counseling have miniscule default rates. 
BRANCHING
A bank branch remains the primary point of entry for con-
sumers to obtain access to financial services. While it seems 
as though there is a bank on every corner in some neigh-
borhoods, others are bank deserts. ANHD has consistently 
called on the city’s banks to fill this void by opening branch-
es where they are most needed. Unfortunately, most of the 
branches that were opened in 2009 were in middle and upper 
income communities. Because only one branch was opened 
in a low-income census tract, the overall share of branches in 
low-income communities fell by almost 1% (see table 4). This 
is not a huge reduction admittedly, but a trend in the wrong 
direction in terms of how banks are meeting the credit needs 
of New York City’s most vulnerable residents.   
FINDING 3
Commercial and savings banks approach reinvestment differently. For the most 
part, savings banks—as local and regional institutions—tend to be more rooted in 
the communities in which they do business.  Because of this, as the tables below 
demonstrate, savings banks exceed their commercial and wholesale bank peers 
on average in terms of how much of their deposits are allocated for core reinvest-
ment activities like multi-family and community development lending, and CRA-
qualified investments.
For example, in terms of Multi-Family Lending, savings banks dedicated a much 
larger share of their deposits in 2009 compared to their commercial and whole-
sale bank peers—6.8% versus 0.004% and 0% respectively. The disparity was even 
Table 4.
SHARE OF CITY’S BRANCHES IN LOW- AND  
MODERATE-INCOME NEIGHBORHOODS
number of  
branch openings
number of LMI 
branch openings
% CHANGE of branches in  
Low Income neighborhoods
% CHANGE of branches  
in Moderate Income  
neighborhoods
27
12
-0.8%
3.2%
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greater in 2008 when savings banks allocated 13.8% of their deposits for multi-family 
mortgage lending. New York Community Bank is the clear leader when it comes to the 
percent of deposits set aside for multi-family lending. As Part I will detail, however, vol-
ume alone is not the only important factor in assessing a bank’s commitment. Indeed, far 
too many of NYCB’s multi-family loans are in a state of distress, which is likely the result 
of aggressive underwriting and doing business with irresponsible borrowers. Therefore, 
regulators must distinguish between productive and unproductive multi-family lending 
when assessing bank performance. 
For Community Development Lending, savings banks committed 0.89% of their deposits 
to this activity on average compared to just 0.53% for commercial banks. And wholesale 
banks posted even smaller percentages than savings banks in every area except philan-
thropy where they had the strongest performance.  Table 7 lists those 
institutions across commercial, savings, and wholesale banks that 
dedicate the largest percentage of their deposits to Community De-
velopment Lending. Interestingly, as this table makes clear, among 
the commercial banks, smaller, regional banks dedicate a greater 
percentage of their deposits for community development lending 
than the city’s largest banks, when tend to be national or global in-
stitutions.
For CRA-qualified Investment, commercial banks dedicated 0.34% 
whereas savings banks reserved 4.75% of their deposits for invest-
ments in affordable housing, and community and economic develop-
ment initiatives.  Again, it is evident that savings banks have dedi-
cated a greater share of their deposits to a core reinvestment activity 
for New York City. Similar to what was established in Community 
Development Lending, the smaller, regional commercial banks per-
formed better than their larger peers. Interestingly, wholesale banks, 
which tend to be assessed on their community development lending 
   The business model 
of savings banks aligns 
better with the needs 
of our communities 
than large commercial 
or wholesale banks;  
yet all banks need to 
do more.
-Benjamin Dulchin,  
ANHD’s Executive Director
Table 5.
AVERAGE % OF DEPOSITS DEVOTED TO REINVESTMENT ACTIVITIES
Multi-Family 
 Lending
Community Dev.
Lending
CRA-Qualified  
Investment
CRA-Eligible  
Philanthropy
.004%
.53%
.34%
.014%
Commercial  
Banks
Savings
Banks
Wholesale
Banks
6.8%
.89%
4.75%
.014%
0%
.33%
.12%
.024%
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and investment, reserved the smallest share – in most cases just a fraction of one percent.
In terms of CRA-eligible philanthropy, all of the top performing banks are within a nar-
row range for how much of their deposits they earmark for philanthropy. Table 9 dem-
onstrates that Deutsche Bank, a wholesale bank, leads the city. Santander/ Sovereign 
and Apple Bank, both savings banks, have the lowest percentage of deposits dedicated 
to philanthropy.
In terms of how commercial and savings banks performed over 2008 and 2009, sav-
ings banks had more positive trends than commercial banks in the following categories: 
community development lending as a percentage of deposits, percent of home purchase 
Table 6.
HIGHEST % OF DEPOSITS DEDICATED TO  
MULTI-FAMILY LENDING  2009
Wells Fargo
Capital One
M&T Bank
.004%
.53%
.34%
Rank Bank Highest % of  
Deposits Dedicated  
to MF Lending
1
2
3
NYCB
Apple Bank
Astoria
34.1%
.06%
.003%
1
2
3
BONY Mellon
Deutsche
Goldman Sachs
0%
0%
0%
3
3
3
SAVINGS BANKS
WHOLESALE BANKS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
Table 7.
HIGHEST % OF DEPOSITS DEDICATED TO  
CD LENDING  2009
M&T Bank
Valley  
National
Capital One
1.25%
1.20%
.94%
Rank Bank Highest % of  
Deposits Dedicated  
to CD Lending
1
2
3
Carver
Apple Bank
Astoria
3.06%
.29%
.11%
1
2
3
Deutsche
BONY Mellon
Goldman Sachs
.42%
.32%
.25%
1
2
3
SAVINGS BANKS
WHOLESALE BANKS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
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Table 9.
HIGHEST % OF DEPOSITS DEDICATED TO  
PHILANTHROPY  2009
M&T Bank
Citibank
Wells Fargo/
Wachovia
.03%
.02%
.02%
Rank Bank Highest % of  
Deposits Dedicated  
to Philanthropy
1
2
3
NY Community Bank
Carver
Ridgewood
.024%
.023%
.01%
1
2
3
Deutsche
Goldman Sachs
.038%
.01%
1
2
SAVINGS BANKS
WHOLESALE BANKS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers, multi-family loans in low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods and CRA-eligible philanthropy as a percentage of deposits. This 
makes sense given that savings banks, for the most part, did not engage in the irrespon-
sible mortgage lending, securitization, investment in credit default swaps, and proprietary 
trading that brought many of the largest financial institutions to the brink of insolvency. 
Benjamin Dulchin, ANHD’s Executive Director, said, “The business model of savings banks 
aligns better with the needs of our communities than large commercial or wholesale banks; 
yet all banks need to do more.”
Commercial banks saw a greater level of improvement in CRA-qualified investment as a 
percentage of deposits compared to their savings bank peers. 
Table 8.
HIGHEST % OF DEPOSITS DEDICATED TO  
CRA INVESTMENTS  2009
Capital One
M&T Bank
Banco  
Popular
1.43%
.55%
.34%
Rank Bank Highest % of  
Deposits Dedicated  
to CRA Investments
1
2
3
Carver
NY Community Bank
Ridgewood
20.34%
2.45%
.84%
1
2
3
BONY  
Mellon
Goldman Sachs
Deutsche
.29%
.04%
.02%
3
3
3
SAVINGS BANKS
WHOLESALE BANKS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
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That being said, in terms of actual dollars lent and invested, savings banks reinvest just 
a fraction of what the city’s largest commercial banks do and often do not participate in 
many of the public programs responsible for affordable housing and community devel-
opment.  Overall, all banks must increase their modest levels of lending and investment 
while also committing to year-over-year growth and being more responsive to local credit 
needs.
OVERALL RANKINGS
ANHD has chosen to rank New York City’s banks in an attempt to demonstrate which 
banks consistently seek to meet our communities’ credit needs, not to characterize them 
as either “good” or “bad.” Because we are analyzing performance at a moment in time, the 
rankings are meant to provide a snapshot of how well each of the city’s banks served the 
credit needs of LMI households and neighborhoods compared to their peers in 2008 and 
2009. ANHD compiled data on 46 different reinvestment activities including branching, 
staffing, multi-family lending, community development lending, CRA-qualified invest-
ment, home purchase loans, and philanthropy. The rankings are based on fifteen indica-
tors that represent core reinvestment activities and those areas where the most data was 
provided by the banks. As the accompanying chart and narrative illustrate, there are few 
RANKING OF NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANKS
Bank of America
Banco Popular
Capital One
20082009
1
2
3
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANKS
M&T Bank
JPMorgan Chase
Citibank
4
5
6
TD Bank7
HSBC
Valley National Bank
Wachovia
8
9
10
Capital One
Banco Popular
M&T Bank
1
2
3
Citibank
JPMorgan Chase
Wells Fargo/ Wachovia
4
5
6
HSBC 7
Bank of America
TD Bank
Valley National Bank
8
9
10
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banks that rank consistently near the top or bottom. Rather, most banks seem to excel in 
some areas and lag in others. It is our hope that these rankings, by assessing each institu-
tion compared to its peers, encourage banks to commit to year-over-year improvement. 
It is our expectation that banks are committed to expanding the volume of these ac-
tivities on a year-over-year basis and improving the marketing and delivery mech-
anisms to ensure low- and moderate-income communities are well served. Un-
fortunately, out of the 18 banks that we examined in both 2008 and 2009, every 
one retrenched in at least one area. These reductions are highlighted in red in 
Appendix A. The rankings will be discussed in greater detail in Part II.
RANKING OF REGIONAL SAVINGS BANKS
Apple Bank for Savings
Sovereign/Santender
Signature Bank
20082009
1
2
3
REGIONAL SAVINGS BANKS
Astoria Federal Savings Bank
NY Community Bank
4
5
Carver Savings Bank
NY Community Bank 
1
2
3 Ridgewood Savings
Apple Bank for Savings
Sovereign/Santender
4
4
6 Astoria Federal Savings Bank
6 Emigrant Savings Bank
Signature Bank8
RANKING OF WHOLESALE BANKS
BONY Mellon
Deutsche  Bank
20082009
1
2
WHOLESALE BANKS
Deutsche Bank
Goldman Sachs
1
2
3 BONY Mellon
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RECOMMENDATIONS
ANHD, like many in the community development sector, believes there are im-
mediate and intermediate steps that can be taken to strengthen and expand 
the CRA so it continues to catalyze community development and other bank 
reinvestment activities.3  These steps include legislative and regulatory actions 
at both the federal and local levels. Indeed, given CRA’s centrality to ensuring 
financial institutions are committed to helping secure the health and vitality of 
our neighborhoods, all options must be pursued.   
Most critical is the need to strengthen the enforcement underpinnings of CRA 
by creating more leverage for community engagement and incentivizing banks 
to seek the highest CRA rating. This can be achieved through local CRA ordi-
nances, which enable greater public engagement or placing greater emphasis on 
public input during the development of local CRA plans and performance evalu-
ations. Additionally, banks, regulators, and community advocates must consider 
the outcomes of a financial institution’s reinvestment activities and not just the 
number and dollar amount. Indeed, ANHD believes the stability and profitability 
of these activities and the long-term financial and economic health of the com-
munity are inherently linked. We believe the actions detailed below would go 
a long way to reverse the negative trends outlined in Part I and ensure banks 
dedicate a meaningful amount of resources to lending, investment and services 
in New York City. 
In the short term, ANHD believes local strategies and federal regulatory reform 
present the best opportunities for reversing the negative trends discussed in this 
report. Specifically, ANHD seeks to: 
1. Pass a Local “Responsible Banking” Ordinance
Although ANHD is optimistic that both regulatory and legislative fixes at the 
federal level will move forward in a timely fashion, we are also mindful of New 
York City’s ability to initiate changes through the local legislative process. Cities 
across the nation including Cleveland and Philadelphia have undertaken simi-
lar strategies with great success while others such as Boston, and Los Angeles 
have introduced ordinances.  These local statutes require banks to submit annual 
reports with the city that detail the programs and products they will offer to 
help meet the respective city’s credit needs. The cities then evaluate the bank’s 
performance based on these reports and reward performing institutions with 
deposits, city contracts, and pension funds. Cleveland and Philadelphia, the two 
cities that have enacted these ordinances, have found the incentives to be suf-
ficient for encouraging banks to develop local plans and create comprehensive 
community development programs. 
3 December 15, 2009, Letter to the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council. Signed 
by 19 institutions including tax credit syndicators, 
community development intermediaries, lenders 
and financial institutions, and advocacy organiza-
tions. Letter available at: http://www.enterprisec-
ommunity.org/public_policy/documents/cra_let-
ter_to_ffiec.pdf
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ANHD is proposing the creation of a “Responsible Banking” ordinance for New York 
City with the following structure:
•   Focus on those banks that are eligible to provide “depository services” to the city.
•   Rank banks according to submission of an annual “strategic plan,” which details 
how they plan to meet the credit needs of local communities as well as an an-
nual “progress report” that states the number and dollar amount of loans, invest-
ments, and services provided by the bank.  
•   Require the city to compile and publicly disseminate the banks’ strategic plans 
and progress reports so elected officials and community groups can engage 
with financial institutions about local credit needs. 
•   Encourage the city to do business with those banks that are the most responsive 
partners in meeting local credit needs. 
We believe that the New York City Responsible Banking Act (Int. 485), which was in-
troduced in early 2011, would create an important tool for local influence on the com-
munity investment practices of our banking institutions, and give the City Council, the 
City of New York, and engaged citizens in communities throughout the city a powerful 
mechanism to provide input related to our credit needs that would help ensure local 
responsiveness and oversight. 
2. Strengthen the regulatory system  by encouraging regulators to tailor assessment crite-
ria to the local performance context, place more emphasis on community development, and 
develop evaluation criteria that considers the quantity and quality of a bank’s lending, invest-
ment, and services.
ANHD recognizes that many banks have tailored their business models in such a way 
that makes it difficult for them to provide certain products or engage in the full range of 
CRA-related activities. That being said, it is ANHD’s belief that for the largest banks, it 
would be hard to justify not providing a product or program that impacts such a large 
segment of the assessment area’s residents and neighborhoods. In New York City, this 
means that lending and investment supporting the creation and preservation of multi-
family properties and community development activities would receive greater weight. 
Indeed, community development loans and investment are central to building strong 
neighborhoods and supporting the work of CDCs, but currently count only for extra 
credit. These activities must receive additional credit to achieve parity with home pur-
chase and small business lending, especially in cities like New York where the housing 
stock is comprised mostly of multi-family rental properties. In the rare case where banks 
cannot be induced to provide the full range of essential products, the banks should be 
required to demonstrate how they are meeting their obligations in other ways.
Furthermore, it is clear that performance assessments have become increasingly vol-
ume driven. This gives an unfair advantage to the largest institutions and leads banks 
to support cookie cutter deals rather than develop innovative products and programs. 
13
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Regrettably, it may also reward banks for engaging in activities that have had a negative 
impact on communities. For example, in New York City, it is likely that bank that under-
wrote “Predatory Equity”-backed deals received CRA credit for loans that have displaced 
low- and moderate-income families and de-stabilized neighborhoods. To our dismay, 
rather than correcting their practices of predatory lending, certain institutions, like New 
York Community Bank, have engaged in fire sales of distressed assets to other specula-
tive buyers who do not have the best interests of tenants in mind.  When ANHD brought 
these overleveraged loans to both federal and state regulators, it became clear they did 
not have the tools to encourage or require the banks to dispose of the assets responsibly. 
Therefore, ANHD believes examinations must move beyond simply rewarding dollar 
and unit volumes, and actually determine which activities have had a positive impact on 
strengthening communities. For example, credit enhancements that enable community 
development financing, such as letters of credit, should be given equal or near equal 
weight to loans and investments. Overall, regulations should be reworked to ensure ex-
ams are not merely checklists that are driven by volume, but the qualitative impact as 
well. 
3. Protect the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) as a strong, independent advocate 
for consumers.
Over the past several months, several bills have been introduced in the House of Rep-
resentatives that seek to weaken the CFPB. To ensure the CFPB is a strong advocate for 
consumers, several key characteristics must be preserved. First, the CFPB must continue 
to remain within the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve Board and not transferred to 
the Department of Treasury. Second, funding for the CFPB must come from automatic 
transfers from the Federal Reserve Board and not subject to annual Congressional appro-
priations. Finally, the CFPB must be led by a single director, not a multi-person commis-
sion, which will delay policy and decision making. In all, these steps should help ensure 
consumers have comprehensible information to make responsible financial decisions, 
gain access to financial services, and are protected from abuse, unfairness, deception, 
and discrimination.
4. Restore Critical Housing Counseling Funding
Housing counseling is a critical and much-needed service provided to home buyers in 
all economic segments, particularly to low-and moderate-income borrowers. Last year, 
HUD- approved housing counseling agencies provided counseling and education servic-
es to over 3 million families nationwide. HUD counselors were successful in preventing 
mortgage delinquency for 1.4 million households and helping 410,000 avoid foreclosure. 
However, in FY 2011, HUD certified housing counselors were hit terribly hard as a result 
of federal budget cuts to the program.  Despite record demand for these essential ser-
vices, funds for housing counselors were zeroed out in FY 2011. Housing counseling is 
critical given that the housing crisis is far from over, wreaking havoc on cities and coun-
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ties across the country. It is imperative that counseling funds are restored to the fullest 
extent in FY 2012.
In the longer term, Congress must pass CRA Modernization legislation that would en-
hance and expand the law to reflect the current structure of the financial industry.
5. Enact CRA Modernization
Again, the CRA has been one of the most important laws for building wealth and revi-
talizing neighborhoods since its passage in 1977. However, the financial services sector 
has changed dramatically in the three decades since and the law has not been altered to 
reflect the shifts in how banks do business and other trends in the lending industry. In 
order to ensure the CRA remains an effective law and meets the on-going needs of LMI 
borrowers and communities, modernization legislation needs to be passed. 
 
Legislation introduced in the 111th Congress, including H.R. 1479, the Community Re-
investment Modernization Act, and H.R. 6334, the American Community Investment Re-
form Act would make many important changes. These bills would:
•   Expand geographical scope of bank examination to include not only where the 
bank has branches, but also where it makes loans through brokers and non-
branch entities. 
•  Combat grade inflation through the requirement of federal banking agencies to 
publish preliminary CRA exams for review and public comment before finaliz-
ing CRA ratings. Additionally, more ratings would be added to reflect gradations 
in performance, which are clearly absent under the current system where 98 
percent of banks receive a passing grade. These changes would help hold banks 
more accountable. 
•   Apply CRA to a variety of non-bank institutions, require federal regulatory agen-
cies to hold more public hearings and meetings when banks merge, enhance 
accountability through data disclosure and introducing more publicly available 
ratings, address racial disparities in lending by requiring CRA exams to explic-
itly consider lending and services to minorities in addition to LMI communities, 
and bolster the accountability of banks to all communities, among other things. 
Similar legislation must be introduced and passed in the 112th Congress. 
Additionally, ANHD recommends expanding data disclosure requirements to include 
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community development activities and create a new community development test for 
large banks. The latter recommendation is especially important as it would encourage 
banks to think more comprehensively about the range of products and policies it needs to 
best fulfill its CRA obligations. The current community development test for a wholesale 
bank could be a model that is adapted for this purpose.  
CONCLUSION
Our ability to help working class families build wealth and ensure the vitality of our 
neighborhoods is dependent on partnerships with banks, local government, community 
institutions and grassroots leaders. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) is a valu-
able tool, which used responsibly helps build wealth and revitalize neighborhoods across 
the country. It is imperative that CRA remains effective and that banks meet the ongoing 
needs of low-and moderate-income communities. 
The data and anecdotal evidence presented in this report demonstrates the deep need, 
now more than ever, for banks to reaffirm their commitment to providing loans, invest-
ments and financial services that are responsible and responsive to local needs. 
In order to meet this objective, it is our continued mission to work to create and maintain 
safe, decent neighborhoods for New Yorkers across all five boroughs and of all income 
levels.
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Passed in 1977 in response to the devastating impact that redlining and disinvest-
ment had on urban areas, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) states that 
banks have an affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs of low- and 
moderate-income residents and neighborhoods in a safe and sound manner. This 
obligation stems from the banks being publicly chartered, receiving low-cost de-
posit insurance and having access to inexpensive credit from the Federal 
Reserve Bank’s discount window. Spurred by the CRA, banks have played 
a critical role in helping to build wealth for households and revitalizing 
many neighborhoods across the city through their support of community 
development efforts and providing access to capital.  
In today’s environment, banks have tightened credit to a level that even 
loans with a strong track record of success are not being made. Consumer 
loans and small business loans have been nearly impossible to obtain. Had 
these loans been made, they surely would have fueled economic growth 
and job creation.   While many banks may raise “safe and sound” consider-
ations to defend this credit tightening, the truth is that these are low risk, 
high impact loans and exactly the type of deals are communities need 
to thrive. For example, there is currently no product for the purchase of 
a mixed used property despite the fact that many main streets need this type of 
financing and that the StoreWorks program has been a successful model over the 
past 15 years.  Banks, in concert with CDCs, should examine the performance of 
deals that have worked and recreate the various products to ensure the full range 
of community credit needs is met.
Several factors, including this tight credit market, have created a strong impres-
sion in the affordable housing and community development industry that banks 
have taken more than they have given over the past several years. In 2009, New 
INTRODUCTION
 NYC’s largest 
banks are less  
interested in pro-
viding traditional 
financial services 
and less focused 
on meeting local 
credit needs.
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York City residents deposited $521.7 billion in 20 of the city’s largest banks. For 
the vast majority of local residents, these deposits represent a bulk of their assets 
and are called upon every month to cover rent and mortgage payments, utility 
bills, groceries, health care costs, and all the other necessities of city life. New 
Yorkers regard these deposits as precious resources that must be protected and 
used wisely. 
Banks, however, view these deposits as something altogether different: cheap mon-
ey that they are able to loan, invest, and leverage for high returns. Fueled by the 
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, the nation’s largest banks have transformed from 
conservative deposit takers to aggressive trading institutions seeking the highest 
return on their capital.4 Less interested in providing traditional financial services, 
it is not surprising that there has been less attention focused on helping to meet 
local credit needs and substantial reductions in reinvestment activities, which will 
be further discussed in Part I. If banks continue to shift their attention away from 
conventional lending and toward proprietary trading, it seems reasonable to cut or 
eliminate the benefits they receive as publically-chartered institutions.   
ANHD is deeply troubled by the lack of commitment to reinvestment activities. 
The bigger issue, however, is that despite their sizable pledges, the truth is that just 
a small fraction of banks’ overall deposits are reinvested. In 2009, only 2.2% of city 
deposits ($11.5 billion) were dedicated to the full range of reinvestment activities 
including community development lending, multi-family lending, home mortgage 
lending, CRA-qualified investments, and philanthropy by these 20 large banks. 
ANHD believes this percentage is grossly inadequate and hopes that this report 
underscores the need for community residents, regulators, and elected officials to 
demand more from our city’s banks.  
Despite empirical evidence proving otherwise, banks are quick to celebrate their 
commitment to communities. In 2009, Bank of America, through its “Commitment 
to Community” campaign, pledged to invest $1.5 trillion over ten years across the 
nation. Here in New York, Bank of America failed to demonstrate this commitment 
as it decreased its multi-family lending by approximately $83 million, its commu-
nity development lending by almost $200 million, and its grantmaking by $300,000. 
JPMorgan Chase, through its “The Way Forward” campaign, touts the bank’s role in 
helping the country recover economically from “the great recession”. At the same 
time as it took out ads in The New York Times celebrating its role in the revival of 
Coney Island as part of this campaign , the bank authorized reductions of $2.3 bil-
lion in mortgage lending, $163 million in community development lending, $147 
million in CRA-qualified investments, and $1.5 million in philanthropy. 
4 Kroll, Andy. “Dems: Ban Banks’ Gambling,” 
Mother Jones.  
Available at: http://motherjones.com/
mojo/2010/03/senators-levin-merkley-bill-
banking-proprietary-trading-ban
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These public relations campaigns illustrate how many banks are more interested 
in talking about community development than actually doing it. The truth is that 
Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase are not alone. Indeed, all 20 banks that we 
analyzed authorized a reduction in lending, investment, or services in at least one 
area in 2009. That being said, the areas of retrenchment are not consistent from 
bank to bank and it is our sense that business opportunities far exceeded the ac-
tual level of reinvestment. 
In addition to presenting this empirical evidence of retrenchment, this year’s “State 
of Bank Reinvestment in New York City” report draws several other notable dis-
tinctions. First, commercial and savings banks operationalize their commitment 
to reinvestment very differently. On average, savings banks dedicate a larger—
though still inadequate—amount of their deposits to core activities. Second, all 
banks have authorized a disproportionate amount of the cuts in low- and moder-
ate-income communities compared to the city as a whole. These findings further 
demonstrate how the evolution of the banking industry from one dominated by 
community-based banks to one controlled by national institutions has resulted in 
our communities being worse off.
The good news is that new tools and reforms have been proposed that should go a 
long way toward reversing these negative trends. ANHD, working with the leader-
ship of the New York City Council including Speaker Christine Quinn, Dominic 
Recchia and Al Vann, has introduced the “Responsible Banking Act.” Rabbi El-
len Lippmann of Kolot Chayeinu/Voices of our Lives, a member congregation of 
Brooklyn Congregations United, said, “The Responsible Banking Act offers com-
munities all over Brooklyn and New York City a first step in creating a new vision 
for our lives. The Act simply asks banks to let us know what actions they are taking 
in our communities. Hopefully, they will go much further and work with commu-
nities to build and preserve affordable housing and spark entrepreneurship. As 
members of the clergy and faith communities, we ask banks to embrace a new 
bottom line, one that prioritizes both human need and financial profit. And the 
city must recognize that residents want their tax dollars deposited and invested in 
banks that accept this vision.”   
At the federal level, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors has signaled its 
intent to propose robust regulatory reform this fall. ANHD will be working with 
our members and allies to ensure these proposals became a reality.
5  Freedberg, Louis. “JPMorgan Chase makes 
millions on California Bonds,” California 
Watch. Available at: 
http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/
jpmorgan-chase-makes-millions-california-
bonds-4536 
and  
http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/
Home/moving-communities-forward.htm 
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Since 2008, ANHD has submitted detailed information requests to New York 
City’s largest commercial, savings, and wholesale banks to get a better sense 
of how well they are serving our communities through lending, investment, and 
services.6  These requests are necessary because other than branching and home 
mortgage data, the vast majority of information related to a bank’s CRA activities 
is not publicly available. And much of what is publicly available is at a geographic 
level that is either too broad or too narrow for our  purposes of looking at citywide 
reinvestment patterns. 
For this year’s report, ANHD extended the information requests to four additional 
banks including Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Carver Federal Savings Bank 
and Emigrant Savings Bank.  Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs became CRA-
covered institutions in fall 2008, so 2009 was the first year where the banks had 
statutory obligations to help meet the credit needs of communities in which they 
do business. 
ANHD has been encouraged by the willingness of most of the city’s banks to pro-
vide us with the requested data. Indeed, of the 22 banks we have submitted infor-
mation requests to, 91 percent (20 banks) have returned at least partial responses. 
Encouragingly, the “Rate of Completeness” improved by 36.7% percent between 
2008 and 2009.7 The “Rate of Completeness” is especially notable since we expand-
ed our data request by six indicators including several new categories related to 
loan modification activities. ANHD believes this strong response rate reflects the 
spirit of the CRA and banks’ recognition that public input is an important compo-
nent of their ability to identify credit needs and opportunities. 
One of the two non-responsive institutions, Signature Bank, did send ANHD infor-
mation that the bank is required to make public—branching and Home Mortgage 
METHODOLOGY
6  Size was determined based on total New 
York City deposits. A sample request letter is 
enclosed as Appendix C.
7 It should be noted that in order to make fair 
comparisons, only institutions that provided 
information in 2008 and 2009 were included in 
trending analysis. For this reason, there is a 
moderate amount of data that banks provided 
for 2009 that we could not use for year-over-
year analysis since the same information was 
not provided in 2008. Appendix A details all 
information that we received from each lender.
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Data—but no other data. Since our policy is to designate a bank as compliant only 
if they provide critical data that is not publicly available, we consider Signature a 
“non-responsive” bank. 
For both Signature Bank and Morgan Stanley8, ANHD made every attempt to 
acquire information by searching the bank’s annual reports and their most re-
cent federal and state performance evaluations. However, the information found 
through these methods is imprecise because data are either presented for different 
time periods and geographic areas or not disclosed at all. And Morgan Stanley, as 
a relatively new CRA-covered institution, has yet to undergo a performance evalu-
ation.
Both Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs were reluctant to comply with our in-
formation request as they did not feel as though their performance in 2009 was 
reflective of their level of commitment to reinvestment. Ultimately, Goldman Sachs 
agreed to respond while Morgan Stanley did not. Goldman Sachs’s decision to 
comply most likely was a function of them having a head start as their Urban 
Investment Group (UIG) had invested in affordable housing when the institution 
was an investment bank. Thus, they had more infrastructure and knowledge of the 
local market than their counterparts at Morgan Stanley. 
That is not to excuse Morgan Stanley’s slow start, however. ANHD first met with 
representatives in March 2009. When we met with them in November 2010, it was 
clear that few significant steps had been taken to build a community development 
lending or CRA team. That being said, we believe Morgan Stanley has finally built 
a strong, large team comprised of seasoned CRA and community development 
professionals. We hope that future years demonstrate this progress. 
Overall, the amount of data we received enabled us to conduct this analysis, but 
it is admittedly imperfect given the fact that many banks did not report across all 
data points. This is problematic because without year-over-year data, it is difficult 
to compare a bank’s performance against its own record as well as its peers over 
several years. Without consistent data, the universe of banks we can include in 
industry-wide analysis for a given year is reduced. Thus, the 2009 data we present 
throughout much of this report for lending, investment and services is not repre-
sentative of the total amount of reinvestment activities by all banks in our study. 
Appendix B presents the total amount of reinvestment reported by all institutions, 
not just the totals for banks that provided data in both 2008 and 2009. As will be 
discussed in Part III, one of ANHD’s key priorities for CRA modernization is to 
require banks to report this important information on an annual basis. The banks’ 
responses are summarized in Appendix A. 
While individual indicators are useful in ascertaining a bank’s year-over-year re-
cord in a certain area over time, ANHD also wanted to compare and rank banks 
against their peers to examine which institutions were leaders within the industry. 
8  Morgan Stanley and Signature Bank have 
been unresponsive to our requests. It should 
be noted that Morgan Stanley, which became 
a Bank Holding Company in 2008, communi-
cated that their 2009 activities did not reflect 
their commitment going forward and therefore 
opted to not respond to our request. While 
ANHD recognizes the banks efforts to build 
their CRA staff related to their wholesale des-
ignation, we feel that the bank had sufficient 
time to operate and report on activities for 
calendar year 2009.
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In an attempt to control for the wide variance in size and the various charters of 
the institutions, which are central to informing their respective business plans, 
ANHD—for comparison purposes—grouped these 22 institutions into the follow-
ing three categories: 
Commercial Banks
A commercial or retail bank’s primary focus is providing financial services to 
corporations. Commercial banks also accept deposits and offer retail products to 
individuals including checking and savings accounts, money market accounts, 
credit cards, and an array of secured and unsecured loans.  While commercial 
banks are not required to have a national service area, the footprint of the major-
ity of New York City’s commercial banks covers numerous markets.  
Savings Banks
A savings bank’s primary purpose is personal banking through the provision of 
checking and savings accounts, credit cards, home purchase and equity loans, 
and financial services to both individuals and small- or medium-sized business-
es. Apart from this retail focus, they also differ from commercial banks by their 
broadly decentralized distribution network, providing local and regional outreach. 
Savings banks tend to have a much more narrow service area although some of the 
savings banks included in our analysis have a multi-state presence. 
Wholesale Banks
A wholesale bank provides financial services to large corporate clients, mid-sized 
companies, real estate developers and investors, international businesses, insti-
tutional customers (such as pension funds and government entities/agencies) as 
well as other banks. Wholesale banks usually deal with only high value and high 
volume transactions. Wholesale banks do not have any branches as they do not 
serve individual customers.
Rankings
Rankings were determined based on the following methodology: Banks that pro-
vided information for a given indicator received a score based on their perfor-
mance compared to their peer banks. Based on the number of banks in each cat-
egory, scores ranged from 1 to 10 for Commercial banks, 1 to 8 for Savings banks, 
and 1 to 4 for Wholesale banks. Banks that had the best performance received a 
score of 1, the second best bank a 2, and so on. For indicators where not all banks 
reported, the upper limit was reduced from 10, 8 or 4 to the number of reporting 
banks. It should be noted that ANHD did not weight the indicators so the actual 
amount of the differential between two banks’ level of activity mattered less in our 
analysis than the more straightforward measure of who did more or less compared 
to their peers.
Although ANHD compiled and analyzed 46 different types of data, banks were 
ranked according to the following fifteen indicators:
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•  Percentage of Branches in Low- and Moderate-Income census tracts
• Percentage of Branches in Low-Income census tracts
• Percentage of Multi-Family Loans in Low- and Moderate-Income  
census tracts
• Percentage of Bank Deposits Dedicated for Community Development  
Lending
•  Percentage of Community Development Loans to Not-for-Profit Borrowers
• Percentage of Home Purchase Loans to Low- and Moderate- 
Income Borrowers
• Percentage of Bank Deposits Dedicated to CRA-eligible Investment
•  Percentage of CRA-eligible Grants Dedicated for Affordable Housing
•  Percentage of Deposits Reserved for Philanthropy 
• Percentage of Community Development Staffing located in NYC
• Percentage of Community Development Loans to Affordable Housing 
•	 Percentage of HAMP Trial Modifications resulting in Permanent  
Modifications
•	 Percentage of CRA Grants to Neighborhood and Community Based  
Organizations
• Percentage of Data Request Completeness
• Raw Score for Community Responsiveness
The fifteen indicators were chosen to capture the spectrum of CRA-related activities of 
importance to low- and moderate-income residents as well as Community Development 
Corporations (CDCs) and the availability of data. Moreover, the selected indicators cover 
the full range of lending, investment and services, but also reflect ANHD’s belief that not 
all CRA-eligible activities are necessarily equal. For example, a community development 
loan to a not-for-profit developer demonstrates not only the bank’s commitment to build 
partnerships with local institutions, but also results in keeping these valuable resources 
under community control which ensures they will be available to residents over the long 
term. Summary tables for each activity are incorporated throughout the report and pres-
ent banks that rank either high or low based on their performance.
After rankings were assigned for individual indicators, a bank’s aggregate score for the 
fifteen indicators was then divided by the number of relevant indicators they were scored 
on to determine their weighted score. Banks were then ranked 1-10 (for commercial 
banks), 1-8 (for savings) or 1-4 (for wholesale) to determine their Overall Ranking. Thus, 
a bank that received a #1 ranking had the strongest record among its peer institutions 
across the indicators we examined and a commercial bank with a #10 ranking, a savings 
bank with a #8 ranking, or a wholesale bank with a #4 banking had the weakest perfor-
mance respectively.  
While banks’ quantitative record is important, ANHD recognizes the significance of the 
qualitative impact of a bank’s CRA-related activities on community development, small 
businesses, financial literacy, wealth creation, and neighborhood stabilization. In fact, this 
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realization was one of the driving factors behind the development of our Reinvestment Prin-
ciples (see Appendix B). One of the common themes throughout the Principles is that how a 
bank approaches its CRA-related work is just as important as what it actually does. Given 
this recognition and our desire that bank’s seek to achieve more than numbers, we added an 
indicator this year that seeks to measure “Community Responsiveness.” Several factors were 
included in this indicator such as:  
• Developing and publishing a local CRA plan
An effective CRA program needs to be locally-focused and flexible so as to meet chang-
ing community needs and priorities. In New York City, priorities change from year to 
year, as new issues arise, and needs also differ among individual neighborhoods.  ANHD 
has asked that all banks doing business in New York City develop a local CRA plan that 
responds to this reality. Several banks reported that they have an internal local CRA plan; 
yet no bank has made their plan public. In the future, ANHD hopes that all banks will 
embrace this principle.  
• Creating an advisory board or another formal mechanism for inviting
    feedback and fostering regular conversations with leaders from the 
    community. 
• Committing to innovative products and policies that respond to local  
market forces and credit needs.
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As ANHD and others have pointed out in the past, structural changes in the bank-
ing industry—including growth and consolidation—have led to a substantial shift 
in the way banks’ approach CRA-motivated lending and investment. Much of the 
growth is due to banks being permitted to conduct both commercial and invest-
ment banking, which was enabled through the repeal of the Glass-
Steagall Act in 1999.9  Additionally, banks doing business in New York 
City continue to grow and consolidate with peer institutions.10  The 
combination of fewer banks serving New York City and those that re-
main being “mega-banks” has had negative consequences on the abil-
ity of banks to serve the unique and varied credit needs of low- and 
moderate-income communities across the five boroughs. 
Community Development Corporations (CDCs), the non-for-profit or-
ganizations at the front lines of neighborhood stabilization and revi-
talization, have experienced this trend dramatically. Although several 
banks have deployed their community development teams to work ef-
fectively with CDCs in the creation of successful loan products and 
community-friendly policies over the past thirty years, this system has been im-
pacted as banks have grown. Larger banks are driven by volume and since these 
loans generally are smaller and more specialized, lenders look at community de-
velopment deals as less appealing.  This is particularly true in institutions that 
have moved their community development functions into mainstream business 
units. Bernell Grier, CEO of NHSNYC, has experienced this first hand. She ob-
serves, “NHSNYC has experienced in the last two years an unwillingness for the 
banks to create new, innovative methods in community development or to exam-
ine programs that have a strong track record of performance and continuing them. 
We need bankers whose first inclination is ‘we can find a way to make this deal 
MAJOR FINDINGS:
Banks Slash Lending, Investment 
And Services, Especially To Low- 
And Moderate-Income Communities
PART I:
     Given that the City of 
New York has increased its 
commitment to affordable 
housing, it is unacceptable 
for banks to decrease their 
commitment to community 
development and neighbor-
hood stabilization. 
9  New York City’s 10 largest banks accounted 
for 69% of the market share for branches in 
2009 compared to 61.8% in 1998. FDIC Sum-
mary of Deposits.
10  Eleven of the city’s 25 largest banks in 1998 
were acquired and merged with other banks in 
the ten year period ending in 2008. “Commu-
nity Development At-Risk: The Troubled Future 
of Bank Reinvestment in New York City,” 
ANHD. Available at: www.anhd.org.
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work.’” ANHD has found that banks that have specialized community develop-
ment groups, like Capital One, are more likely to have this inclination and achieve 
much stronger performance overall. 
Although ANHD is increasingly focused on the quality and impact of banks’ lend-
ing, investment and services, we are equally concerned about the falling quantity 
of loans and investments.  Similar to what we heard when examining the banks’ 
2008 reinvestment activities, many banks continue to justify these substantial de-
creases in lending, investment and philanthropy by blaming “the economic crisis,” 
not their institution’s indifference to meeting their obligations under CRA. This is 
puzzling on many fronts. 
First, many banks posted record profits and had more available capital; yet still 
did less to help meet the community’s credit needs. Furthermore, as ANHD has 
pointed out in the past, community development is countercyclical, which means 
the private market’s interest in projects that have a public purpose and access to 
public subsidy intensifies when the economy overall weakens. This is evident in 
the increased investment of public resources by the city’s housing agencies over 
the past several years. For example, the number of completed units financed or 
assisted under the city’s New Housing Marketplace Program increased by 4,331 
units from FY 2008 to FY 2010 resulting in a 34.53% jump. Of the 16,874 completed 
in FY 2010, 5,389 were new construction projects completed by HPD and HDC and 
11,485 were preservation projects. Given the significant increase in commitment 
to affordable housing by the city, it is unacceptable for banks to wane on their 
commitment. 
Finally, a bank’s obligation to help meet the credit needs of the communities in 
which it does business is tied to the benefits it receives as a federally-chartered in-
stitution. As long as the bank receives these benefits, there should be no retrench-
ment. Thus, while volatility in the larger economy and a weaker balance sheet 
surely affected banks’ ability to lend and invest, these factors do not fully explain 
or justify the significant reduction in core CRA-relative activities.
Certainly, ANHD continues to find it disturbing that many banks have used the re-
cent recession to excuse their reduced commitment to serving low- and moderate-
income communities. Our message to regulators, elected officials, and the banks 
themselves is that using the economic recession to excuse their reduced commit-
ment is an insufficient answer. Rather, banks should be working hard to develop 
creative, cost effective strategies for keeping owners and renters in their homes 
and stabilizing neighborhoods. 
DEPOSITS
As a city of over 8 million people and the financial capital of the world, New York 
City provides financial institutions access to stable and significant customer de-
posits. These deposits constitute the most secure and cheapest source of capital 
29
11  New York City is the headquarters for many 
wholesale and national commercial banks, 
which means that they may book deposits 
here that may not be tied to a local resident. 
For example, the deposit information for Gold-
man Sachs essentially represents both their 
national and NYC deposits since the bank has 
only one other small branch in Utah. This dis-
tinction should not matter when determining 
a bank’s local CRA obligations, however, since 
obligations are tied to an assessment area and 
banks choose their assessment areas. In other 
words, if Goldman Sachs is holding deposits in 
NYC and chooses the city for its assessment 
area, the full amount of these deposits should 
establish its obligations.
12  Regulators use Tier 1 Capital to estimate 
the volume of a given bank’s lending, invest-
ment and services. While this may be the best 
indicator for determining the entire bank’s 
commitment, ANHD believes that a bank’s 
local deposit base is a better method for 
determining reasonable levels of reinvestment 
for individual assessment areas like New York 
City. 
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for banks. Additionally, a bank’s deposit base provides the truest indication of a 
bank’s presence in the city and consequently, the scope of their local CRA obliga-
tion.11  Therefore, as explained in our Reinvestment Principles, many of ANHD.’s 
benchmarks for lending, investment, and philanthropy are tied to the size of a 
bank’s local deposits.12 Unfortunately, as the data below illustrates, an incredibly 
small percentage of these deposits are reinvested in the community.   
As table 10 below details, total deposits in New York City for 15 of the city’s larg-
est banks increased from $446.4 billion to $484.9 billion—a one year increase of 
8.6%. This follows a 10.2% increase from the previous two-year period. It is clear 
that New York City’s banks—already large institutions—are getting even bigger. 
Indeed, New York City’s ten largest retail banks hold a staggering 76.4% of all 
city deposits—a percentage that has been increasing steadily over the past several 
decades. Viewed through this lens, ANHD believes it is reasonable to conclude that 
most banks doing business here had an even greater responsibility to meet the 
credit needs of working class residents in 2009 than in previous years. 
Table 11.
That being said, five banks reported a smaller deposit base in 2009 compared to 
2008, and the average decrease was 10.6%. While ANHD hopes that a smaller de-
posit base does not translate to less reinvestment, our position is that any poten-
tial decrease should be commensurate to the decrease in deposits. As finding two 
explains, however, reinvestment activities—especially lending and investment in 
low- and moderate-income communities—tend to suffer a disproportionate de-
crease than mainstream activities. 
Although an increase in deposits should be seen as a positive development for 
the economy as a whole, how the depository institution re-deploys that capital 
in a local market is equally important. As the following examples illustrate, how-
ever, for numerous banks there seems to be an inverse relationship between the 
size of their deposit base and the amount of lending and investment they commit 
to their assessment area. For example, JPMorgan Chase saw an increase in de-
posits of $14.5 billion (+6.6%) but authorized double-digit decreases to its home 
purchase lending, community development lending, CRA-qualified investments, 
and philanthropy, which will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections. 
Additionally, in terms of commercial banks, HSBC, TD Bank, Valley National and 
M&T, despite larger deposit bases, all reduced at least some of their lending or 
investment over this period.
TOTAL DEPOSITS FOR 15 of  
NYC’s LARGEST BANKS (billions)
$446.38 b $484.89 b 8.6%
2008 2009 % CHANGE 
THE STATE OF BANK REINVESTMENT IN NEW YORK CITY: 2011  |  ANHD  
30 PA R T  I
There are similar trends for savings banks. In 2009, 
Santander/ Sovereign increased its deposit base by 
$800 million—an increase of 12.5%—yet authorized 
considerable reductions across the board in multi-
family lending, community development lending and 
CRA eligible investments. For instance, Santander/ 
Sovereign reduced its CRA-qualified investments by 
100%, meaning the bank did not invest a single dollar in 2009. Furthermore, the bank 
nearly eliminated its multi-family lending by authorizing a 98% reduction between 2007 
and 2009. Over this same three-year period, the number of community development loans 
was reduced by 60%, while the dollar amount lent was also reduced by 82%. 
Astoria Federal Savings Bank saw an even larger increase—from $4.7 billion to $12.8 
billion—a whopping 172.6% jump. Although the bank expanded its community devel-
opment lending from $3.1 million to $14.6 million, their grantmaking remained flat at 
$490,000. By comparison, TD Bank, with only $9 billion in deposits, gave over $1.4 million 
in CRA-eligible philanthropic support in 2009.
Of the ten commercial banks serving New York City, Wells Fargo/Wachovia, the second 
largest bank based on national deposits, had the greatest drop in city deposits, decreas-
ing $650 million, from $3.98 billion to $3.33 billion in 2009.  Even though the bank has 
signaled its intent to expand its retail presence in New York City, this growth did not 
materialize in 2009. Wells Fargo/ Wachovia also zeroed out their community development 
lending in 2009 and reduced CRA eligible grants in New York City by 3.5%. 
In terms of savings banks, Signature Bank’s deposits shrunk by $1.4 billion from $5.4 
billion to $4 billion—a 26% decline from the previous year. In the one area where data is 
publically available—home purchase lending—Signature saw a disproportionate reduc-
tion in the volume and dollar amount of lending compared to its smaller deposit base. The 
number of home purchase loans originated by Signature between 2008 and 2009 fell from 
32 to 22 (-31.3%) and the dollar value slipped from $21.7 million to $8.2 million (-61.2%). 
New York Community Bank and Apple Bank also saw declines in city deposits and both 
institutions decreased their commitment to reinvestment in at least one area at a greater 
level than their deposits’ shrunk. 
This evidence suggests that the community is not necessarily better served as banks’ 
deposits grow nor are residents’ convenience and needs better met as a result of mergers.
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT LENDING
Community development lending—loans to both for-profit and non-profit borrowers for 
affordable housing rehabilitation and construction, neighborhood revitalization, small 
business development, and job creation initiatives—fuels economic development and is 
the engine that enables the construction of new affordable housing and community facili-
ties. The quality of New York City’s housing stock and the vitality of its neighborhoods 
   The key to successful 
lending is staff who under-
stand local communities 
and programs.
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depends on the availability of this capital. Although some banks have remained commit-
ted partners on certain types of deals, the industry as a whole is reducing its financial 
investment and seems less interested in responding to local needs through the crafting of 
innovative approaches.
Between 2008 and 2009, there was a 39% reduction in the number of community develop-
ment loans (from 308 to 187) originated in New York City. In dollar terms, the decrease 
was nearly 37% (from $2.1 billion to $1.4 billion). These figures cover 14 of the city’s 
largest banks so the true magnitude of reductions is likely greater. The fact that several 
banks failed to include this data in their response may reflect their inclination to conceal 
a decrease in the number and value of loans they made. Nevertheless, the reported reduc-
tions amount to very large sums of money. 
Citibank was the only commercial bank that made more community development loans 
in 2009 compared to 2008. However, despite a 267% increase in the number of CD loans, 
in terms of CD dollars lent, there was actually a 56.7% decrease. Notably, Citi’s CD lend-
ing has fallen from $616.3 million in 2007 to just $68 million in 2009.
For savings banks, Astoria Bank and Santander/ Sovereign also saw modest increases 
in the number of new community development loans. Astoria grew its CD loan portfolio 
from two to five loans, and Santander/ Sovereign made one additional CD loan in 2009 
to bring its total to four loans. In terms of wholesale banks, Deutsche Bank increased 
the number of CD loans by 85.7% (from 7 to 13) and dollar amount by 36.5% (from $42.5 
million to $62.1 million).
CITI SHOWS SIGNS OF A RESURGENCE
As detailed in last year’s “State of Bank Reinvestment in NYC” report, Citi’s decline in 
community development lending was largely the result of sizeable reductions in the 
bank’s Community Capital group as well as the need to  shift its focus toward asset 
management and preventing losses on its “for sale” portfolio. While not excusing this 
retrenchment, ANHD has been encouraged by the steps the bank has taken to re-staff 
the Community Capital group and re-commit itself to being one of the city’s most active 
community development lenders. 
For example, as reported in The Nonprofit Quarterly, Citi partnered with the City of New 
York in March 2010 to invest $576 million to preserve 5,674 units of public housing.  Citi 
also created a $100 million fund to preserve overleveraged multi-family properties. 
Finally, Citi Community Capital was ranked the top affordable housing lender by 
Affordable Housing Finance  magazine in 2010.13
ANHD is encouraged by these steps and hopes the bank continues to exhibit progress.
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In 2009, to our disappointment, Wells Fargo/Wachovia and 
TD Bank both zeroed out community development lending 
in New York City. While Wells Fargo/Wachovia saw a decline 
in deposits in New York City, the bank had a wildly profitable 
year and saw year-over-year profits increase by almost 200%. 
Furthermore, TD Bank was profitable and saw an increase in 
deposits by nearly 32% from the previous year. Both of these 
banks are new to the New York City market and entered 
through acquisitions of smaller institutions. Thus, to our dis-
may, we see once again how larger banks acquiring smaller 
institutions has not served the convenience and needs of lo-
cal residents nor does it lead to increased lending, investment 
and services.  
Of the savings institutions, Apple Bank had the greatest de-
cline in the number of loans, reducing the number of loans by 
nearly 67% from 12 to 4 loans. Ridgewood Savings Bank does 
not do any community development lending as it does not fit 
into their business model of providing more long-term capital 
through multi-family mortgage loans.
As table 11 illustrates, banks have dedicated a very small 
percentage of their deposit base to community development 
lending. For most banks we analyzed, this amounts to less 
than one percent of their total city deposits.
Interestingly, wholesale banks—whose performance evalua-
tion places greater emphasis on the institution’s community 
development-related activities—have similarly weak records 
in terms of deploying their asset base to make loans for com-
munity development. For example, Deutsche Bank, Bank of 
New York Mellon and Goldman Sachs only lent 0.42%, 0.32% 
and 0.25% respectively of their city deposits for community 
development purposes. Unfortunately, this represents an even smaller percentage 
than the previous year. If Bank of New York Mellon lent at the same rate as M&T, 
for instance, the bank’s community development lending would increase from $158 
million to $600 million – a meaningful increase by any measure.
Although the low percentage of deposits dedicated to community development 
lending is disappointing, the trend of banks reducing their community develop-
ment lending in the recent past may be more distressing. Other than Deutsche 
Bank and Astoria Federal Savings, every bank we examined saw a reduction in 
either the number or dollar amount of community development lending. For ex-
ample, in 2008, Bank of America increased community development lending by 
an impressive 154% from the previous year. However in 2009, Bank of America 
13  See: http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/
index.php?option=com_content&view=artic
le&id=2002:nonprofit-newswire--citigroup-
to-help-finance-20000-nyc-housing-units-
&catid=155:nonprofit-newswire&Itemid=986).
 
See: http://housingsfinance.com/news/
ahf/080210-ahf-Citi-Launches-New-York-
Preservation-Fund.htm). 
See: http://www.housingfinance.com/news/
aft/021411-aft-The-Top-10-Affordable- 
Housing-Lenders-of-2010.htm 
Table 11.
HIGHEST % OF DEPOSITS DEDICATED TO  
CD LENDING  2009
M&T Bank
Valley National
Capital One
1.25%
1.20%
.94%
Rank Bank Highest % of  
Deposits Dedicated  
to CD Lending
1
2
3
Carver
Apple Bank
Astoria
3.06%
.29%
.11%
1
2
3
Deutsche
BONY Mellon
Goldman Sachs
.42%
.32%
.25%
1
2
3
SAVINGS BANKS
WHOLESALE BANKS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
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retrenched, reducing lending by nearly 75% from 2008. Table 
12 demonstrates those institutions that reduced their lending 
by the greatest percentage over this period.
For the three commercial banks, these reductions amount to 
a decrease of $293.2 million; the savings banks accounted 
for a $9.1 million cut. Two out of the four wholesale banks 
we analyzed, including Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs, 
raised their community development budgets by $16.6 mil-
lion and $82.7 million respectively. However, this increase 
is dwarfed by the $1.4 billion decrease in community devel-
opment financing that evaporated in the city between 2008 
and 2009 across the industry. BONY Mellon, which recently 
changed its designation from a retail bank to a wholesales 
bank, experienced the largest decline with a nearly 41% cut 
in CD Lending.
The news is not all bad, however. Between 2008 and 2009, 
there was a 36.4% increase in the number of community de-
velopment loans (from 118 to 161) made with not-for-profit 
borrowers. From a neighborhood stabilization perspective, 
loans to not-for-profit developers are especially important as 
these developers commit to maintaining permanent afford-
ability, working with households that are rebuilding their 
credit, and building truly livable units that meet the needs 
Table 12.
BANKS THAT AUTHORIZED LARGEST  
DECREASES IN CD LENDING  2009
TD Bank
Wells Fargo/
Wachovia
Bank of America
-100%
-100%
-74.44%
Rank Bank Highest % of  
Deposits Dedicated  
to CD Lending
1
2
3
Carver
Apple Bank
-46%
-27.5%
1
2
BONY Mellon -40.42%1
SAVINGS BANKS
WHOLESALE BANKS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT LOANS TO  
NOT-FOR-PROFIT DEVELOPERS  2009
Deutsche
Astoria
Citibank
Rank Bank
1
2
3
JPMorgan Chase
Apple Bank
4
5
Capital One
Bank of America
100%
100%
95.49% Carver Federal Savings
75.79%
75%
75%
M&T Bank
75%
TD  Bank
Wells FargoBanco Popular
Santender/Sovereign
6
7
40%
39.1%
28.2%
12.5%
0%
0
Highest % of  
CD Loans to Not For 
Profit Developers
Lowest % of  
CD Loans to Not-For- 
Profit Developers
Table 13.
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of local residents in terms of unit size and deeper affordability. ANHD’s Reinvest-
ment Principles recommend that banks make at least 50% of their community de-
velopment loans with not-for-profit organizations – a reasonable threshold given 
the nature and purpose of these deals. As table 13 notes, only 1/3 of the banks we 
analyzed have met this threshold.  
As mentioned above, CDCs have found that in order to do business with most of 
the city’s banks, they need to bring a certain type of deal to the table. Michelle de 
la Uz, Executive Director of the Fifth Avenue Committee and ANHD Board Chair, 
says CDCs continue to hear the following message from banks, “We are 
only interested in doing deals upwards of $5 million or $10 million. ‘We 
emphatically respond that our communities loans of all sizes and it is 
our experience that even the smallest deals have an outsized impact.’” 
For example, New York City’s Participation Loan Program (PLP) is 
a core source of financing for owners of affordable housing who are 
trying to maintain their properties in a state of good repair. Through 
PLP, the city’s housing agency provides up to $100,000 per unit at a 1 
percent interest rate, which is combined with private financing from a 
participating lender, to deliver a composite financing cost that is below 
market. These deals are extremely low risk for private lenders given 
the city’s financial stake in the project. Many lenders, however, feel 
that the amount of time it takes to underwrite these deals is too bur-
densome given the relatively small size of the loans. The Community 
Preservation Corporation and Low Income Investment Fund are the 
only lenders participating in a meaningful way. Without private financing, many 
owners cannot maintain their properties, which leads to unsafe, unhealthy living 
conditions for tenants and stressed neighborhoods.
MULTI-FAMILY LENDING
Multi-Family Lending are loans, either originations or re-financings, to individual 
landlords or investors of multi-family properties, such as an apartment building 
with five or more units.  Approximately 40% of all residential units in the city 
are located in multi-family rental properties,14 and almost nine in ten low- and 
moderate-income households in the city are renters. The availability of responsi-
bly-underwritten mortgages and other forms of commercial loans are absolutely 
essential for a healthy, thriving housing stock and city. Many ANHD groups began 
in the 1970s and 1980s as a response to “redlining” when banks refused to make 
loans in working-class neighborhoods of color. ANHD and our members fought 
to get responsible banks back into our neighborhoods so they would not stagnate. 
More recently, we fought to slow speculative lending fueled by predatory equity 
that created overleveraged properties that have fallen into a state of both fiscal 
and physical distress. The dual phenomena of redlining and predatory equity are 
two sides of the same coin: responsible lending—not too much, not too little—is 
essential to healthy neighborhoods.
PA R T  I
14  New York University Furman Center for 
Real Estate and Urban Policy, “State of New 
York City’s Housing and Neighborhoods: 2010.” 
Available at: www.furmancenter.org. 
    Loans to not-for-profit 
developers are important as 
these developers commit 
to maintaining permanent 
affordability, working with 
households that are rebuild-
ing their credit, and building 
truly livable units that meet 
the needs of local residents 
and deeper affordability.
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Given this reality, ANHD holds that if a bank is serious about establishing a com-
prehensive, locally-responsive CRA-strategy for New York City, multi-family lend-
ing must be a meaningful part of its reinvestment activity.15 This is particularly 
evident in the case of JPMorgan Chase and Citibank. ANHD believes it is unac-
ceptable that two of the city’s three largest banks have stated that multi-family 
loans are not a part of their business plans. The banks have explained this decision 
by stating that multi-family loans are not profitable enough.  
As the recent economic turmoil has made apparent, banks’ desire for huge, short-
term returns has often led them to take on very risky deals—those that on paper 
promise a sizeable return on investment but in practice have a higher likelihood 
of default. Committing to a meaningful amount of multi-family lending—in addi-
tion to ensuring credit is available to owners serving so many of the city’s work-
ing class residents—would provide both a reasonable and less risky return. Thus, 
JPMorgan Chase and Citi must not continue to sit on the sidelines; it is essential 
to the health of our multi-family housing stock that they re-enter the market in a 
meaningful way.Between 2008 and 2009, there was a 37% reduction in the number 
of multi-family loans (from 975 to 447) originated in New York City. In dollar terms, 
the decrease was 13.6%, falling from $2.3 billion to $2.0 billion.16
Of the ten commercial banks, Citibank had the greatest drop in the number 
amount of multi-family loans, declining by nearly 77% from 59 loans in 2008 to a 
paltry 14 loans in 2009. In terms of dollar amount, it was a steep decline of $150 
million, down 84% from the previous year. Following closely, TD bank decreased 
its multi-family portfolio by 16 loans, resulting in a 76% drop from the previous 
year. In terms of dollars, TD Bank reduced multi-family lending from $35 million 
to $11 million, a decrease of 69%.
Regarding savings banks, Santander/ Sovereign and Astoria Bank both experi-
enced a staggering retrenchment in multi-family lending. Santander/ Sovereign 
reduced the number of multi-family loans by 101, a 95.3% reduction from the pre-
vious year. In terms of dollar amount lent, we saw equally disturbing decreases 
of 98.2%, from $339 million to $6 million, an alarming reduction of $333 million 
from the previous year. Based on increases in New York City deposits of $800 
million, ANHD believes that this level of retrenchment in multi-family lending 
is indefensible. 
Astoria Bank also demonstrated significant reductions in multi-family lending, 
down 97% in the number of loans, from 168 to 5. In terms of dollars lent, Astoria 
Bank decreased lending by nearly 99%, from $328 million to $4 million, a startling 
decline of $324 million from the previous year. In 2009, Astoria Bank saw a huge 
jump in deposits of $4.7 billion, from $8.1 billion to $12.81 billion. Given this tre-
mendous increase, ANHD believes it is imperative that the savings bank plays a 
more significant role in expanding multi-family lending in New York City.
15  Multi-family loans are commercial  
mortgages and therefore considered per-
manent financing. For the purpose of CRA 
reporting, banks are allowed to count multi-
family loans as part of both their HMDA and 
Community Development lending. Given their 
importance to the city’s affordable housing 
sector, ANHD separates them out.
16 According to The Furman Center’s an-
nual report “State of the City’s Housing & 
Neighborhoods 2010”, multi-family loan 
originations experienced a sharp increase in 
2009, as the result of historically low interest 
rates. This finding conflicts with ANHD’s data, 
but this could be explained by the fact that we 
focused our analysis on banks only whereas 
the Furman Center examined all lenders. This 
discrepancy in lending patterns underscores 
the need to expand and modernize CRA to 
cover all lending institutions, not just  
chartered banks.  
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Only two commercial banks, JPMorgan Chase and Well Fargo/Wachovia, saw in-
creases in their multi-family portfolios. JPMorgan Chase increased multi-family 
lending from 3 to 25 loans, which translated into an increase of $45.75 million 
from the previous year. Given its stature as the city’s largest bank, this level of 
multi-family lending remains grossly inadequate. Wells Fargo/Wacho-
via also increased multi-family lending by 37.5%, resulting in a net gain 
of 3 loans. In terms of dollar amount, Wells Fargo/Wachovia increased 
multi-family lending by $903 million from the previous year. Since this 
nearly $1 billion in multi-family lending covered just 11 deals, loans 
were very large on average.
Ridgewood Savings was the only savings bank with increases in multi-
family lending. Ridgewood Savings increased multi-family lending by 
$47.5 million, an impressive increase of 51% from 2008. 
The reductions in multi-family lending are disconcerting when one 
considers that much of the “lost” loans were in low- and moderate-income 
neighborhoods. For example, there was a 57.8% reduction (from 
386 to 163) in the number of loans and a 48.4% drop (from $983 million to $507 
million) in dollars of multi-family loans made in LMI tracts over the two 
year period. 
Of the ten commercial banks, four institutions reported decreases of more than 
50% in multi-family lending in low-and moderate-income tracts. TD Bank had the 
greatest percentage decline in the number of multi-family loans in low-and mod-
erate-income tracts. In fact, TD Bank all but eliminated multi-family lending by re-
ducing the number of loans from 16 to 1, a 93.8% decline. Given that TD Bank had 
increased New York City deposits by $2 million and remained profitable, ANHD 
believes this steep reduction in multi-family lending activity is unacceptable. 
Citibank reduced the number of multi-family loans by 81%, the second highest per-
centage decline after TD Bank, but relative to TD Bank, this represents twice fewer 
loans. In terms of dollars lent, Citibank saw a 79% decrease from $119.9 million 
to $24.7 million. Bank of America also demonstrated retrenchment in multi-family 
lending in LMI tracts, by reducing the number of loans from 34 to 9, and a reduc-
tion in dollar amount from $233 million to $108.3 million, a 53.6% slide. Rounding 
it out, M&T Bank reduced the number of multi-family loans in LMI tracts by 50%, 
in addition to a 76% decline in dollar amount lent, from $8.8 to $2.1 million. 
In terms of savings banks, Astoria Bank had a colossal decline not only in the 
number of loans in LMI tracts, but also in the dollar amount in LMI tracts. Astoria 
Bank demonstrated the greatest level of retrenchment of all of the savings banks, 
reducing the number of loans by 97% (from 99 to 3) as well as reducing the dollar 
amount lent from $176.9 million to $1.70 million, an astonishing 99% drop.  
   Responsibly  
underwritten multi-
family mortgages 
are essential to the 
health, sustainability 
and affordability of 
housing in New  
York City.
37
ANHD  |  EVIDENCE OF RETRENCHMENT
 PA R T  I
As mentioned above, Santander/ Sovereign drastically 
reduced multi-family lending. And the declines were 
even more drastic in low- and moderate-income com-
munities. Santander/ Sovereign reduced the number of 
loans by nearly 97% from 60 to 2 loans, as well as de-
creased the dollar amount lent also by nearly 97% from 
$153 million to $5 million.
While 40% of the savings institutions reduced multi-
family lending in LMI tracts, there were a few institu-
tions that demonstrated a commitment to multi-family 
lending in low-and moderate-income tracts. For ex-
ample, despite declines in overall multi-family lending 
and reductions in New York City deposits in 2009, Ap-
ple Bank increased the number of multi-family loans to 
low-and moderate-income tracts by 280% from 5 to 19 
loans. In addition, they also increased the dollar amount 
lent by 123.6%, $11 million to $24.6 million in 2009.
Table 14 illustrates those institutions that have the low-
est percentage of multi-family lending in LMI tracts. 
Furthermore, the table details how the leading savings 
banks have a smaller share of their loans in low- and 
moderate-income neighborhoods than larger retail 
banks. This is likely due to the fact that savings banks 
do not have as large a footprint as commercial banks and concentrate their branching in 
more affluent neighborhoods. 
ANHD continues to be concerned about the lack of multi-family lending. Unfortunately, 
the situation may get worse depending on the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. An 
active secondary market is central to the health of the multi-family lending business and 
ANHD will work aggressively to ensure GSE reform does not have any negative conse-
quences for this type of lending. That being said, our immediate problem continues to be 
those lenders who did lend, but at unsustainable levels and to actors whose business model 
is predicated on displacing working class tenants. 
Indeed, ANHD has consistently called for lending that is both safe and sound and has a 
positive impact on the city’s rent regulated housing stock and working class neighbor-
hoods. However, too high of a percentage of loans made by New York Community Bank 
and other institutions represents exactly the type of lending we do not want given its de-
stabilizing effect on tenants and workingclass neighborhoods. 
As last year’s “State of Bank Reinvestment in NYC” report outlined, ANHD has been work-
ing to protect tenants living in buildings owned by predatory equity-backed landlords 
Table 14.
LOWEST % OF LENDING IN LMI TRACTS (2009)
TD Bank
M&T Bank
HSBC
20%
20%
36.4%
1
2
3
Apple Bank
Carver
NY Community Bank
9.45%
15%
39.53%
1
2
3
BONY Mellon 11.4%1
SAVINGS BANKS
WHOLESALE BANKS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
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across the city over the past several years.17 Too many disreputable owners 
operating in the Bronx obtained financing from New York Community Bank, 
which often underwrote loans based not on current rents but at projected 
higher rents that would be obtained once existing tenants were forced out. 
It should be noted that New York Community Bank may not have been the 
most aggressive lender in terms of over-leveraging properties; however, tenant 
organizers and the City of New York have spent more time trying to preserve 
properties where the bank holds the mortgage than any other lender. 
As table 15 illustrates, this may be because New York Community Bank has 
the most units in a state of physical and fiscal distress of any lender doing 
business in the five boroughs. Based on research conducted 
by the University Neighborhood Housing Program (UNHP) 
using its “Building Indicator Project,” we have learned that 
almost 19,500 units of housing—13.8% of the bank’s total 
portfolio—are at-risk. The magnitude of these numbers re-
flects a fundamental problem with how the bank conducts 
its multi-family lending business.
ANHD along with our member organizations CASA New 
Settlement Apartments, Flatbush Development Corpora-
tion, Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition, 
Pratt Area Community Council, and University Neighbor-
hood Housing Program as well as other allies including 
UHAB, Tenants & Neighbors, and National People’s Ac-
tion have been working over the past year to undo much 
of the damage caused by the bank. We have met with rep-
resentatives from the bank numerous times and each time 
have hoped that the bank would take the necessary steps 
to force owners to maintain the properties or initiate a pro-
cess where they are transferred to more responsible own-
ers. While several of the bank’s community relations man-
agers have been somewhat helpful at brokering meetings 
between tenants and landlords, no notable progress has 
been made in terms of improving living conditions or writ-
ing down the mortgage to a level that is sustainable. In fact, 
we have been especially troubled by the bank’s practice of 
selling the notes on troubled buildings at prices that have 
proven unsupportable and to landlords with track records 
of abusing tenants, neglecting their properties, and stripping communities of 
precious affordable housing. 
Desiree Pilgrim-Hunter, President of the Northwest Bronx Community and Cler-
gy Coalition, said, ”New York Community Bank’s refusal to acknowledge past 
mistakes and remove these properties from the speculative cycle is unacceptable. 
PA R T  I
17  Multi-family loans are commercial  
mortgages and therefore considered  
permanent financing. For the purpose of CRA 
reporting, banks are allowed to count multi-
family loans as part of both their HMDA and 
Community Development lending. Given their 
importance to the city’s affordable housing 
sector, ANHD separates them out.
Table 15.
HIGHEST % OF UNITS AT-RISK  
ACCORDING TO BIP DATA (2009)
Valley National
JPMorgan Chase
Wells Fargo/
Wachovia
8.1%
6.8%
5.7%
1
2
3
NY Community Bank
Signature
Ridgewood
13.8%
10.4%
10.1%
1
2
3
Deutsche 7.7%1
SAVINGS BANKS
WHOLESALE BANKS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
BONY Mellon 7.5%2
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Tenants in the Bronx will not stop fighting until their homes are returned to a 
state of good repair and in the hands of owners who are committed to preserving 
affordability.”
Bank regulators and elected officials must get a commitment from New York 
Community Bank that they will not originate these destructive loans going for-
ward, enforce good repair clauses for mortgages it currently holds, and only 
sell notes to lenders who are responsible and committed to maintaining the 
properties as affordable housing.  
As New York Community Bank seeks to divest itself of these troubled mort-
gages, Signature Bank has entered the market and become a key source of 
financing for what appears to be the next wave of speculative predatory equity 
investors.  Signature Bank appears to either be purchasing the notes at a slight 
discount and inexplicably loading even more debt on the building or paying 
too high a price for a note given the property’s physical conditions and rent 
GOOD VS. BAD MULTI-FAMILY LENDING
Multi-family housing is the back bone of New York City. Multi-family lending helps 
maintain the rental housing stock and ensures millions of New Yorkers have a place to 
call home. The problem with multi-family lending arises when banks irresponsibly lend 
to bad landlords and provide financing that is not based on the building’s current rental 
income, which results in over-leveraged buildings. Inevitably, these buildings fall into 
disrepair which endangers tenants and the surrounding neighborhood. Selling the loans 
at unsustainable prices to the next wave of speculative buyers once the property faces 
physical and financial distress is not the solution. Rather we expect banks to acknowl-
edge the true value of the property as affordable housing, write down the mortgage, and 
commit to responsible lending from the start going forward. 
Overall, we need banks like New York Community Bank that are committed to multi-
family lending at a meaningful level. However, the quality and impact of the loans they 
make matters equally as volume. Assuming NYCB continues to be a leader in terms of 
the quantity of multi-family lending, it is our expectation that the bank improves the 
quality of those loans both in terms of how they are underwritten and who they are made 
with. 
We are seeing a developing trend, as commercial banks are moving out of the multi-
family lending marketplace, of savings banks increasing their appetite for these types of 
loans. In order to preserve our neighborhoods, it is important for lenders, including New 
York Community Bank to be mindful of the negative consequences that bad loans and 
bad actors can have on entire communities.
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roll.  This underscores the need for systemic solutions and not just interventions 
that target specific institutions.
For these reasons, regulators must not view every multi-family loan made in a LMI 
neighborhood equally as some loans better meet the needs of poor and working 
class residents and communities more than others. Additionally, given what is cur-
rently happening with many of these overleveraged properties and poorly under-
written loans, one needs to question how and if they passed the regulators’ “safety 
and soundness” test as there are many simple, straightforward ways to determine 
the soundness of a loan. For example, one primary indicator of default danger that 
regulators should be examining is the Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR), which 
measures the amount of cash flow available to meet annual interest and princi-
pal payments on debt. Of the dozens of deals ANHD has examined, the DSCR is 
universally under 1 and often less than .5, which means only $0.50 in income is 
available for every dollar of debt owed. Despite this incredibly low DSCR, neither 
the bank nor the regulator questioned the merit of these loans or the impact they 
would have on residents and neighborhoods. Clearly, more needs to be done on 
multiple levels to prevent these speculative loans. If regulators do not have the 
power to guide a bank’s underwriting standards, Congress should give them the 
statutory authority to do so.   
HOME PURCHASE LENDING AND FORECLOSURE PREVENTION
New York City has a large homeowner population; approximately 1/3 of our resi-
dents are homeowners. As such, we have a continuing need for responsible home 
mortgage lending as well as foreclosure prevention initiatives.
HOME PURCHASE LENDING
Home Purchase Loans are extended to consumers by financial institutions to be 
used towards the purchase of a home. According to The Furman Center’s “2010 
State of New York City’s Housing and Neighborhoods” report, the number of first 
lien, conventional home purchase loans originated in New York City decreased by 
26% from 2008 to 2009.18 The report also states that the overall number of home 
purchase loans originated in New York City has declined considerably, falling from 
59,169 in 2005 to 24,461 in 2009. This reduction led to a decline in the number 
of conventional home purchase loans to borrowers of each race. Black and His-
panic borrowers were especially negatively impacted. For instance, blacks make 
up about 23% of city households but only received 10% of home purchase loans. 
Likewise, Hispanics, which represent 29% of the population, were responsible for 
just 8% of all originations in 2009. It should be noted that the Furman Center study 
looks at all originators of home purchase loans including banks, their affiliates, 
and mortgage brokers while ANHD looks only at banks.
Of the banks we analyzed between 2008 and 2009, the number of Home Purchase 
Loans originated to all households fell by 37.5%—an even larger decrease than the 
PA R T  I
18  New York University Furman Center for 
Real Estate and Urban Policy. “20010 State of 
New York City’s Housing and Neighborhoods. 
Available at: http://furmancenter.org/files/
sotc/SOC%202010.pdf
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Furman Center found. This likely means that banks reduced their home purchase 
lending at a greater rate than other lenders like mortgage companies. The 37.5% 
reduction represents a decrease from 20,519 mortgage loans to 12,834. In terms of 
dollar amount of Home Purchase Lending, the reduction was even greater. Total 
dollars lent fell from $7 billion to 4 billion, a slide of 42.9%. 
In terms of commercial banks, M&T Bank was the only commercial bank that not 
only increased overall home purchasing lending but also increased home purchase 
lending to LMI borrowers. In 2009 M&T Bank increased the number of mortgage 
loans from 223 to 324, resulting in a 45% increase. Over a two year period be-
ginning in 2007, M&T Bank has demonstrated a solid commitment to increasing 
home purchase lending in New York City, inclusive of lending to LMI borrowers.  
Bank of America also increased the number of home pur-
chase loans from 1,782 to 3,170—a 79% increase from 
the previous year. However, while Bank of America did 
in fact see a boost in overall home purchase lending, it 
should be noted that the bank decreased home purchase 
lending to LMI borrowers by a staggering 50%.
The commercial banks with the greatest decrease in over-
all home purchase lending are Banco Popular, JPMorgan 
Chase, and Citibank. JPMorgan Chase had decreases 
in both the number of home purchase loans and dollar 
amount lent. JPMorgan Chase had a staggering 64% decline in home purchase 
loans from 8,279 to 3,022 in 2009. In addition to a reduction in the number of loans, 
JPMorgan also decreased the amount lent by $2.3 billion from the previous year. 
In terms of savings banks, Santander/Sovereign, one of the largest savings banks, 
increased the number of home purchase loans from 249 to 383—a jump of 53.8%. 
Apple Bank had the biggest drop in home purchase loans from 223 to 93—a 58.3% 
decline. In terms of dollar amount, the cut was even greater as lending fell from 
$185 million to $70.2 million—a 62.1% fall. Apple bank did see a modest 7.9% 
reduction in deposits and 35% slide in profits, but again, it is unfortunate that 
lending fell by larger percentages. 
Home Purchase Loan products that facilitate new homeownership opportunities 
are especially crucial to ensuring low- and moderate-income households have the 
credit they need to achieve the American dream. Table 16 illustrates those banks 
that have made the best effort to ensure a meaningful percentage of their mort-
gage lending serves LMI households. 
Between 2008 and 2009, the number of home purchase loans to low- and mod-
erate-income borrowers in New York fell from 2,451 mortgages to 912—a fall of 
62.7%. Of the 912 loans to low-and moderate-income borrowers, 132 loans were 
to low-income borrowers. As a percentage of their overall home purchase lending, 
   In 2009, banks reduced 
overall home purchase 
lending; however, the 
greatest reductions were 
to low-and moderate-in-
come borrowers.
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the proportion of home purchase loans to LMI borrowers 
fell by 40%. This exceeds the 37.5% reduction that home 
buyers as a whole experienced. Thus, we can see the banks’ 
reduction in home purchase lending disproportionately af-
fected lower income New Yorkers. 
While this industry-wide decline is staggering, several in-
stitutions authorized even sharper reductions. Over this 
two year period, TD Bank decreased the number of mort-
gage originations to low- and moderate-income borrowers 
from 71 to 13—an 81.7% cut. These reductions occurred de-
spite $2.94 billion in profits and a 31.4% increase in New 
York City deposits. 
Citibank also significantly reduced their home purchase 
lending to LMI borrowers. In 2009, Citibank decreased 
home purchase lending to credit worthy, LMI borrowers 
by 76.1%.  In 2008, Citibank facilitated new homeowner-
ship opportunities to 1,623 LMI borrowers, totaling $575 
million. In sharp contrast, in 2009, Citibank significantly 
reduced home purchase lending to only 388 LMI borrowers 
totaling $46 million. 
In 2009, Citibank posted a loss of $1.6 billion and saw a 4.7% reduction in deposits. 
Nonetheless, this level of retrenchment is unacceptable from a CRA perspective. It 
is clear that the bank made countless unsafe and unsound business decisions over 
the past several years that not only led to its own financial troubles, but also con-
tributed to the nationwide recession. It is ANHD’s perspective, however, that poor 
business decisions fueled by greed and speculation should not diminish the bank’s 
obligation to meet its CRA mandate of helping to meet the credit needs of working 
class communities. If regulators believe that deploying capital would undermine 
a bank’s balance sheet, they should consider this information during the bank’s 
performance evaluation and reduce their rating accordingly. 
In addition, Banco Popular reduced their mortgage lending to LMI borrowers by 
90%. It should be acknowledged, however, that Banco Popular has a very small 
portfolio of home purchase loans. 
Not all banks reduced their lending to low-and moderate-income borrowers. In 
fact Capital One increased the number of home purchase loans by 175% from four 
loans in 2008 to 11 loans in 2009. Despite Capital One’s modest comparative loan 
volume, the bank demonstrated commitment to not only increasing year-over-year 
originations, but also to developing a new loan product that would better serve the 
New York City market. Capital One’s loan product provides a grant of up to $6,000 
for home or condo purchase or up to $3,000 toward co-op purchase in a LMI tract. 
PA R T  I
Table 16.
LARGEST % OF HOME PURCHASE LOANS 
(HPLS) TO LMI BORROWERS   2009
Capital One
M&T Bank
Banco Popular
28.21%
23.15%
14.29%
1
2
3
Carver
NY Community Bank
Santender/  
Sovereign
50.94%
19.23%
14.10%
1
2
3
SAVINGS BANKS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
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For New York City and Rockland/Westchester Counties, the maximum income to 
qualify for the grant is $82,000.
The only other commercial bank to come close to a substantive increase in home 
purchase lending to LMI borrowers was M&T Bank. In fact, M&T surpassed its 
impressive numbers of overall home purchase loans detailed above. Over the two 
year period, M&T expanded the number of LMI loans from 29 to 75—an increase 
of 158.6%. M&T should be commended for the huge strides it made over this pe-
riod. 
In terms of savings banks, Santander/ Sovereign was the only institution that in-
creased its lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers. And the expansion 
was an impressive 80%—from 30 mortgage loans to 54 loans.  The bank was one 
of the most profitable in the city—posting a profit of $12.6 billion and also growing 
its deposits by 12.5%
Across the industry, however, ANHD believes there are few lenders, if any, that 
should be considered a standard bearer in serving this population. And it is impor-
tant to point out that this lack of lending to credit-worthy borrowers, coupled with 
a rising tide of foreclosures, are having a de-stabilizing effect on certain neighbor-
hoods where abandoned properties have caused surrounding property values to 
fall. 
More specifically, ANHD’s Reinvestment Principles urge banks to commit to mort-
gage lending to low-income households that is proportionate to the percent of 
low-income households in the city as a whole. Given that about 10% of households 
in the city are occupied by low-income owners, ANHD would like to see 10% of 
a bank’s home purchase loans being originated to these households. Of the 13 
banks that provided ANHD with mortgage data, Capital One is the only commer-
cial bank that exceeds this threshold with 10.2% of its home purchase loans being 
originated with low-income borrowers. Additionally, Carver Bank is the only sav-
ings bank that also meets or exceeds this threshold with 26.4% of its home pur-
chase loans being originated with low-income borrowers. Banco Popular and TD 
Bank are the only commercial banks that did not commit a single home purchase 
loan to low-income borrowers. Both Banco Popular and TD Bank significantly re-
duced their mortgage lending services by over 80% from the previous year.  
There is a model for serving low-income households in a sustainable fashion. Both 
Neighborhood Housing Services of New York (NHS) and the New York Mortgage 
Coalition (NYMC) provide financial workshops, pre-purchase counseling, and ac-
cess to competitive, fixed-rate loans and payment assistance in the form of closing 
cost grants and down payment subsidies.19 
19  NYMC is a not-for-profit collaboration of 
financial institutions and community-based 
housing agencies dedicated to helping low- to 
moderate-income families in New York, Long 
Island and Westchester County achieve the 
dream of responsible homeownership. The 
community groups participating in the NYMC 
include Asian Americans for Equality, Cypress 
Hills Local Development Corporation, Harlem 
Congregations for Community Improvement, 
Neighbors Helping Neighbors, Pratt Area 
Community Council, Housing Partnership 
Development Corporation, Housing Action 
Council, and the Long Island Housing Partner-
ship. Participating lenders include Amalgam-
ated, Astoria Federal Savings & Loan, Bank of 
America, Capital One, Citi, HSBC, JPMorgan 
Chase and M&T. http://www.nymc.org/home 
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The New York Mortgage Coalition assists first time home buyers through pre-pur-
chase counseling and financial education to help households meet the necessary 
criteria for home purchasing. 
In 2009, community-based housing organizations in the New York Mortgage Coali-
tion (NYMC) partnered with New York City-based banks to originate 648 mortgag-
es citywide. Out of 7 participating lenders, HSBC committed the largest share of 
overall LMI loans made through the coalition, resulting in 33% of all loans closed 
in 2009 through the coalition. Of the 306 home purchase loans originated by HSBC 
to low-and moderate-income borrowers, 211 (69%) of those loans were facilitated 
through the New York Mortgage Coalition. HSBC currently has the highest overall 
volume of loans through the coalition and has closed over 22% of all loans NYMC 
has ever done. HSBC is a strong coalition partner that has developed a steadfast 
approach to servicing the needs of households and we applaud their effort in 
this area. 
Not only does HSBC have a robust staff of loan officers, HSBC, along with M&T 
and Astoria Bank is a participant in the Federal Home Loan Bank of New York’s 
“First Home Club” program. The “First Hme Club” program is a savings matching 
program for households with incomes at or below 80% of area median income. The 
program encourages prospective homebuyers to save towards the purchase of a 
new home. The FHC provides down payment and closing cost assistance by grant-
ing four dollars in matching funds for each dollar saved in a dedicated account 
(up to $7,500 in matching funds) to an eligible first-time homebuyer purchasing 
a home.20
While banks like HSBC have been strong partners of the NYMC, there are some 
institutions that are lending to fewer low-and moderate- income borrowers. For 
example, in 2009 Citibank originated 388 home purchase loans to low-and moder-
ate-income borrowers, of which approximately 10% of the loans were facilitated 
through the Mortgage Coalition. This is a discouraging statistic as there is a strong 
model in place and a very healthy market for these loans. 
The community based organizations help homeowners in all five boroughs of New 
York City. Of the 648 mortgages originated in 2009, Suffolk and Queens County 
had the greatest number of committed loans by financial institutions. 30% of the 
committed loans were in Suffolk County, followed by 25% in Queen County. 
As mentioned above, the number of mortgages originated with LMI homebuy-
ers across the city fell by 62.8% (from 2,451 to 912) between 2008 and 2009. The 
number of similar mortgages originated with homebuyers counseled by Mortgage 
Coalition members increased by nearly 10% (from 449 originations to 498 orig-
inations) over the same period. Thus, the Mortgage Coalition’s share of all LMI 
mortgage loans rose drastically over the past year, from 18% to 55%. One possible 
reason that banks expanded their home purchase lending with members of the 
PA R T  I
20  Federal Home Loan Bank of New York 
“First Home Club” http://www.fhlbny.com/
community/fhc/fhc.htm America, Capital One, 
Citi, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase and M&T. http://
www.nymc.org/home
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Mortgage Coalition while shrinking their overall lending is that they recognize 
that the Mortgage Coalition’s model works.  Indeed, Ken Inadomi, Executive Di-
rector of NYMC, says, “It is important to point out that because of mandatory and 
comprehensive pre-purchase counseling, these are incredibly safe loans. In fact, 
the foreclosure rate on the 5,000+ loans originated through NYMC is less than 1%.” 
FORECLOSURE PREVENTION
Over the past several years, millions of homeowners have faced losing their homes 
through foreclosure. Thus, in addition to a need for affordable home purchase 
loans, including responsible products targeted to LMI borrowers and first-time 
homebuyers, it is also important that banks have products and programs in place 
to preserve homeownership and prevent foreclosure. 
The reasons for the foreclosure crisis are well-documented so this report will not 
repeat them. However, it is important to acknowledge the millions of homeowners 
across the country facing foreclosure and discuss the quantitative record of banks 
related to modifying these unaffordable loans.21 While both banks and govern-
ment have rolled out various initiatives to keep families in their homes, the pri-
mary vehicle for this effort is currently the federal Home Affordable Modification 
Program (HAMP). According to HAMP data, there were almost 52,000 active loan 
modifications in the New York metropolitan statistic area as of December 2009.20 
As a percentage of eligible loans to be modified, Bank of America had the worst 
record of modification of the largest loan servicers. Of Bank of America’s approxi-
mately 1.1 million eligible loans, only 7% in August 2009 and 19% in December 
2009 22 were in either an active or permanent trial. 
Bank of America’s sub-par service has not gone unrecognized. In December 2010, 
PICO National Network and National People’s Action released an annual report 
card giving Bank of America- the nation’s largest bank-an “F” rating for its dismal 
foreclosure prevention and lending performance. According to the report card, 
for the almost two years, Bank of America had completed permanent modifica-
tions for only 18.7% of eligible borrowers compared to peer institutions such as 
JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo/Wachovia and Citibank, who performed permanent 
modifications for 30% or more of eligible borrows.23 In addition to distressing 
modification statistics, Bank of America continues to maintain a dual credit sys-
tem as the bank maintains a stake in four of the top five publicly held payday 
lenders—subsequently charging low-income and minority communities exorbi-
tant fees and interest rates. Table 17 demonstrates that many of its peer banks had 
much better track records in New York too.
In addition to HAMP data, ANHD was able to gather information related to some 
of the city’s largest servicers’ proprietary foreclosure prevention programs. JPM-
organ Chase, the largest bank in New York City, has one of the lowest rates of 
21  It is important to acknowledge that this 
data covers a larger geographic area as it 
represents the banks’ activity in the MSA, not 
just New York City.
22  Making Home Affordable, “March Loan 
Modification Report.”   
Available at: http://www.makinghomeafford-
able.gov/news/latest/Documents/MHA-Pub-
lic_090909.pdf
23  Source: Bank of America Report Card, 
December 2010
 http://www.yp.com.hk/everwin/
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home modifications. JPMorgan Chase’s lack of effort to modify mortgages has 
been singled out by National People’s Action and New York Communities for 
Change, as the bank has serviced a large number of mortgages in the city yet 
turned down a majority of requests for mortgage modifications.24 According to 
our 2009 quantitative analysis, only 6 percent of New York City homeowners who 
sought to modify their mortgages with JPMorgan Chase between July 2008 and 
December 2010 were able to get permanent loan modifications. Thus, while JPMor-
gan Chase has been targeted for their poor performance nationally and at the state 
level, the truth is their record in granting permanent modifications is even worse 
here in New York City.
Even among those banks who have demonstrated a stronger willingness to offer 
their clients a trial or permanent modification, there have been pervasive reports 
of lost paperwork, unresponsive staff, unreasonable delays, and a general reluc-
tance to take the necessary steps to achieve a sustainable outcome.  Indeed, there 
is a sense among borrowers, counselors, and attorneys that obstacles are being put 
in place that make it typical for some borrowers to wait more than a year to secure 
a modification, if at all. 
In 2009, New York Mortgage Coalition (NYMC) community-based housing orga-
nizations counseled over 2,700 individuals facing foreclosure in New York City. 
Coalition members have helped thousands of New Yorkers achieve responsible 
homeownership. Through pre-purchase counseling, financial workshops and fore-
closure mitigation services, NYMC groups continue to help preserve homeowner-
ship throughout New York City. Below are two stories that represent just a small 
fraction of the issues homeowners have encountered in trying to save their homes.
Harlem Congregations for Community Improvement (HCCI), an active Harlem re-
vitalization group, has offered guidance and support to hundreds of Harlem house-
holds facing home foreclosure. Eustace Samuel, a native of Antigua and 25-year 
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JPMorgan Chase
Citi Mortgage
Wachovia
25%
23%
13%
COMMERCIAL BANKS
Bank of America 7%
ACTIVE MODIFICATIONS AS A SHARE OF  
ESTIMATED ELIGIBLE 60+ DAY DELINQUENCIES   (2009)
Rank Bank
1
2
3
4
Citi Mortgage
JPMorgan Chase
Wachovia
Bank of America
47%
37%
36%
19%
Current 
Modifications as  
% of Eligible Loans 
Table 17.
August 2009 December 2009
Bank
1
2
3
4
Current 
Modifications as  
% of Eligible Loans 
Rank
24  Source: New York Times: Unions to Press 
Chase on Modifying Additional Mortgages 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/
nyregion/10chase.html?_r=1
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resident of the Bronx was not only hit hard by the economic downturn, he also 
faced mounting personal misfortunes. With the decline of work through the car-
penter’s union and an irresponsible tenant who caused damage to his home, Mr. 
Samuel was $15,000 in delinquent mortgage payments. In 2010, Mr. Samuel was 
contacted by his bank, informing him of foreclosure on the home he shared with 
his wife and two sons.    
Seeking help, Mr. Samuel turned to Reverend Charles Butler, Director of The Of-
fice of Equitable Development at HCCI. When Mr. Samuel reached out to HCCI, 
he was no longer receiving timely rent payments from his tenant and Section 8 
ceased their $1,200 monthly rent contribution. He was in dire straights and need-
ed a solution to help save his home. With the help of Rev. Butler and HCCI, Mr. 
Samuel was able to get his finances back in order and was able to work out a trial 
modification on his home.  
Since working with Rev. Butler and HCCI, Mr. Samuel has been granted 3 trial 
modifications on his home loan, but has yet to receive a permanent modification. 
The ordeal has left Mr. Samuel very frustrated as he believes trial modifications 
are an imperfect solution to a problem facing millions of homeowners. Regardless 
of his frustrations, Mr. Samuel is grateful to HCCI for its help. Without HCCI’s as-
sistance, Mr. Samuel would have lost his home, causing his family great distress. 
Pratt Area Community Council (PACC), a community development corporation, 
also contributes heavily to the development and preservation of communities in 
central Brooklyn. PACC’s foreclosure counselors have been instrumental at pre-
venting and helping to remediate the often disastrous consequences of scams, un-
affordable mortgages, job loss and most importantly, foreclosure prevention. 
Ms. Hazel Mitchell first approached PACC because she had fallen behind 11 
months on her monthly mortgage payments with Bank of America and the bank 
began to threaten to foreclose. Prior to reaching out to PACC, Ms. Mitchell made 
attempts to resolve the issue with Bank of America, but was offered no assistance.
In June 2010, on behalf of Ms. Mitchell, PACC applied for a modification with Bank 
of America, however, the bank did not review the file correctly and consequent-
ly denied Ms. Mitchell’s application. The bank requested additional documents, 
which were sent multiple times to Bank of America. With the help of the Center 
for NYC Neighborhoods (CNYCN), PACC filed a legal complaint on behalf of Ms. 
Mitchell with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and went to 
Washington, D.C. to advocate on behalf of Ms. Mitchell and other clients who have 
been abused by poor banking practices. 
On December 14, 2010, the Office of the President and CEO of Bank of America 
sent an official letter to Ms. Mitchell responding to the OCC complaint and a mort-
gage modification offer, reducing Ms. Mitchell’s mortgage payments. 
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Because of organizations like Harlem Congregations for Community Improve-
ment (HCCI) and Pratt Area Community Council (PACC), who have been tirelessly 
working on behalf of homeowners like Mr. Samuel and Ms. Mitchell, thousands of 
New Yorker’s have been able to reach amicable agreements with banks and lend-
ers to avoid foreclosure on their homes.
CRA-QUALIFIED INVESTMENT
CRA-qualified Investment is a lawful investment, deposit, membership share, 
or grant that has as its primary purpose community development. For example, 
banks may purchase state and local government bonds that fund the construc-
tion or rehabilitation of affordable housing. As table 18 illustrates, CRA-qualified 
investment among New York City banks significantly declined – in some cases 
substantially – between 2008 and 2009. For the seven banks that provided data in 
both years, total investment decreased from $818.75 million to $520.06—a 36.5% 
decline.  Of the 15 banks that provided data in 2009, the vast majority of CRA-qual-
ified investments were in the form of Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC). 
Indeed, of the $628.6 million invested by these institutions, $481.1 million (76.6%) 
was LIHTC.25
Although we initially speculated that the decline in CRA-qualified investment 
would be attributed to a decreased investment in LIHTC26 brought about by record 
losses and subsequent lack of tax liability, the truth is, over 80% of the city’s banks 
posted profits in 2009. And the average profit was almost $3.4 billion. Thus, the 
banks looking to offset tax liability given these profits should have an appetite for 
tax credit investment. 
Of the four banks that were not profitable in 2009, three (Citi, Banco Popular and 
Carver) continued investing in tax credits – either LIHTC or New Markets Tax 
Credits (NMTC). ANHD commends these institutions for not walking away from 
this core activity. It is this type of commitment that we feel bank regulators should 
give special attention as it signals the banks’ recognition that poor and working 
class communities are disproportionately harmed by economic recessions. 
The only bank that did not invest in LIHTC or NMTC, Bank of New York Mellon, 
lost over $1 billion in 2009, a 175% decrease compared to its $1.4 billion in profits 
the previous year. While these losses are unfortunate, it is troubling that the bank’s 
CRA-qualified investment fell by even more—a staggering 467%—from $160.6 
million to $21 million over the two year period (see Table 18). And the bank’s num-
bers may have fallen even more had it not been for ANHD alerting the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York of the bank’s intention to pull out of several tax-exempt 
bond deals with the City of New York. After ANHD wrote a letter to the Fed, BONY 
Mellon re-affirmed its commitment to invest. Another important factor to consider 
when trying to understand BONY Mellon’s reduced CRA-qualified investment is 
that the bank’s deposits were up 25% from 2008. Overall, BONY Mellon’s drastic 
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25  This significant percentage is likely due 
to several factors. First, as the headquarter 
city of many of these banks, their interest in 
LIHTC investment is more stable than in areas 
outside of their service area. Second, pricing 
for tax credits were less volatile in New York 
City than other jurisdictions so investors likely 
viewed them as more attractive. Finally, both 
New York State and New York City maintained 
their investment in affordable housing so a 
constant flow of deals was presented to the 
banks. 
26  LIHTC is a central element of the financ-
ing for approximately 90% of all affordable 
housing development according to Enterprise 
Community Partners, “About the Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit.” Available at: http://www.
enterprisecommunity.com/products_and_ser-
vices/lihtc.asp
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decrease comes as a surprise given the bank’s recent 
change in designation to a wholesale bank, which tend 
to rely more on investments to fulfill their community 
development obligations. 
In comparison, Capital One, Citibank, New York Com-
munity Bank and Ridgewood Savings increased their 
CRA-qualified investments between 2008 and 2009. 
Capital One expanded qualified investments from 
$113 million to $229 million—an extraordinary jump 
of 102.6%. Despite Capital One being a fraction the 
size of the city’s largest commercial banks, the bank 
now has the distinction of investing more than any 
other institution in CRA-qualified projects. As Table 
19 highlights, Ridgewood Savings Bank also deserves 
credit for substantially expanding CRA-qualified in-
vestments from $7.8 million to $19.9 million—a jump 
of over 154%.
Overall, a much smaller share of banks’ deposits are 
being devoted to CRA-qualified investments than in 
previous years. In 2008, the ten banks ANHD analyzed 
in this category dedicated an average of 0.19% of their 
deposits to CRA-qualified investments. Those same in-
stitutions only contributed 0.11% in 2009—a decrease 
of 41.8%. This statistic is another indication that banks 
are reserving smaller and smaller amounts of their 
overall capital for reinvestment purposes.
PHILANTHROPY
CRA-related philanthropy, which consists of banks 
providing grants for general operating and program-
specific support, and sponsorship of fundraising ga-
las, conferences, and community education events 
in the communities in which they do business, has 
played and continues to serve a crucial role in the abil-
ity of community groups to further their missions of 
creating and preserving safe, decent affordable hous-
ing and neighborhoods for low- and moderate-income 
New Yorkers. The city’s banks have been key partners 
in providing not only general operating and program-
specific support, but also sponsorship of fundraising 
galas, conferences, and community education events. 
In the past, it was rare for a bank’s philanthropic bud-
get to shrink even when banks were deploying less 
capital overall. In 2009, however, grant support was 
not immune from drastic cuts. 
Table 18.
LARGEST % DECLINE IN CRA-QUALIFIED  
INVESTMENTS  2008-2009
HSBC
JPMorgan Chase
TD Bank
-67.3%
-50.5%
-34.62%
1
2
3
Sovereign/
Santender
Apple Bank
-100%
-92.03%
1
2
BONY Mellon
Deutsche
-466.89%
-60%
1
2
SAVINGS BANKS
WHOLESALE BANKS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
Table 19.
LARGEST % CHANGE IN CRA-QUALIFIED  
INVESTMENTS  2008-2009
Capital One
Citibank
102.65%
1%
1
2
Ridgewood
NY Community Bank
154.6%
58.83%
1
2
SAVINGS BANKS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
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Between 2008 and 2009, CRA-eligible grant making decreased by nearly 5%, from $37.4 
million in 2008 to $35.6 million in 2009. Only three banks, TD Bank, Citi, and Deutsche 
Bank increased their commitment to philanthropy in 2009. TD Bank increased CRA-el-
igible philanthropy from a paltry $290,000 to a respectable $1.4 million—an increase of 
377% from 2008. Despite a modest 3% increase in deposits, it is encouraging to see that 
TD Bank has expanded its commitment to CRA-related philanthropy. TD Bank is also a 
leader in terms of the percent of its deposits that it dedicates to philanthropy. Citi and 
Deutsche Bank saw more modest increases, of 14.7% and 5.7% respectively.  
Unfortunately, this commitment is not shared by all of the institutions serving New York 
City. For example, for commercial banks, Banco Popular (-91.6%), HSBC (-49.8%) and 
Capital One (-33.7%) shrunk their grant budgets substantially. These reductions are espe-
cially troubling for HSBC and Capital One, which both posted larger profits in 2009 than 
the previous year.
For the second year in a row, JPMorgan Chase reported a decline of nearly 13% in CRA-
related philanthropy. Despite an extremely profitable year and record growth, it is once 
again evident that the community does not do better when the bank’s fortunes rise. In fact, 
of the eleven commercial banks ANHD 
examined, JPMorgan Chase had one of 
the smallest percentage of deposits—just 
0.004%—dedicated to philanthropy. It 
also must be noted that the JPMorgan 
Chase and Washington Mutual merg-
er of 2008 continues to result in fewer 
combined resources being deployed in 
neighborhoods across New York. ANHD 
believes this is a problem both the FDIC 
and OCC should address in the bank’s 
next examination and in any bank failure 
going forward. 
For savings banks, Santander/ Sovereign 
and Ridgewood Savings Bank reduced 
their grant budgets by 77.5% and 30.2% 
respectively. 
ANHD’s members are experiencing these 
cuts in deep and varied ways. Indeed, 
almost every ANHD member has seen 
grant support from financial institutions 
fall and many have seen double digit 
percent decreases. Additionally, many 
members have reported that banks are 
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Table 20.
HIGHEST % OF DEPOSITS FOR PHILANTHROPY  2009
M&T Bank
Wells Fargo/ 
Wachovia
Citibank
.028%
.0212%
.0206%
1
2
3
NY Community Bank
Carver
.0241%
.0230%
1
2
SAVINGS BANKS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
Ridgewood .0051%2
Deutsche
Goldman Sachs
.0378%
.0104%
1
2
WHOLESALE BANKS
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shifting their support away from homebuyer education 
and pre-purchase counseling into broader categories like 
financial education with a particular emphasis on youth 
programs. While these are important initiatives and work 
that our members are committed to, it is shortsighted and 
unwise for banks to abandon a model that both serves 
first-time homebuyers and drives business opportunities 
for the banks.   
 
Again, overall bank deposits in New York City increased by 
8.6 percent from the previous year. This increase is a clear 
indication that institutions are safe, sound and profitable. 
However, community development lending, CRA-qualified 
investment and CRA-related philanthropy declined in 
2009. While ANHD believes it is logical to link a bank’s 
philanthropic budget to its earnings, we are discouraged 
by the percentage of a bank’s deposits that are earmarked 
for grant making. Table 20 shows those banks that dedicate 
the largest percentage of its deposits. M&T Bank is the 
leader in this area. Yet it is easy to see that an incredibly 
small amount of deposits are deployed for philanthropic 
endeavors as no bank comes close to committing even a 
single percent of their deposit base to these initiatives.
There is another grantmaking trend that we are concerned about: the smaller percent-
age of CRA-eligible grants to support affordable housing. In 2008, 36.5% of CRA-eligible 
grants were dedicated to a purpose related to affordable housing compared to 33.0% in 
2009. Given that a lack of affordable housing is an overwhelming problem for such a high 
share of working class New Yorkers, ANHD has set a target of dedicating at least 50% of 
a bank’s CRA-related philanthropy to housing-related activities. Over the two year period, 
Bank of America, HSBC, Wells Fargo/Wachovia and Deutsche Bank were the only institu-
tions that met this threshold at least once. And in 2009, only HSBC demonstrated a strong 
commitment to CRA-grants for affordable housing with 72% of its CRA-grants dedicated 
to this purpose. 
Several savings banks reported a very small percentage of CRA-eligible grants to support 
affordable housing compared to commercial and wholesale banks. For instance, as table 
21 highlights, New York Community Bank and Carver Bank —the leaders among savings 
banks— reported 5% and .04% respectively. While we recognize that savings bank often 
do not have comparable grantmaking staffs as the large commercial banks, which makes 
it more difficult to respond to local needs, it is surprising that these institutions have not 
targeted more of their grantmaking to affordable housing given its importance in New 
York City. 
BRANCHING
Table 21.
HIGHEST % OF CRA GRANTS FOR  
AFFORDABLE HOUSING (2009)
HSBC
Bank of America
Wells Fargo / 
Wachovia
72%
41%
39%
1
2
3
NY Community Bank
Carver
5%
.04%
1
2
SAVINGS BANKS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
Deutsche 36%1
WHOLESALE BANKS
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Lack of access to credit and basic banking services in neighborhoods continues 
to be a serious problem for low- and moderate-income New Yorkers. Currently, 
of the 15 banks ANHD examined regarding branching in both 2008 and 2009, ap-
proximately 22.5% of total branches are located in LMI areas. ANHD’s threshold 
for equitable branching is 25%, which means for the industry as a whole, there is 
room for improvement. While we are encouraged by the somewhat modest 2.1% 
increase in the number of branches in LMI communities over this two year period, 
it is clear that far too many working class New Yorkers do not have access to af-
fordable financial services.  
A recent study by the office of former Congressman Anthony Weiner (NY-9) found 
that “there is a bank for every 2,300 New Yorkers living in neighborhoods with a 
median household income above $53,000-but there is only one bank 
for every 9,000 people in neighborhoods with a median household 
income below $31,000.” 27
 
In addition, the report found that more than 825,000 New Yorkers, 
mostly low-income individuals, are un-banked and do not have 
checking and savings accounts with a bank or credit union. ANHD 
sees how this lack of access to mainstream financial services has 
stripped wealth and led to the rise of predatory lenders in neighbor-
hoods across the city including Bushwick in Brooklyn, Jamaica in 
Queens and Melrose in the Bronx.  Thus, one of our primary reinvestment priori-
ties is that local banks establish equitable branching patterns.  
Again, in terms of equitable branching, ANHD wants 25% of a bank’s total branch-
es in New York City to be located in LMI neighborhoods. This is a reasonable bench-
mark given almost 56% of census tracts in New York City are classified as low- and 
moderate-income meaning that more than half of the households living there earn 
a moderate-income wage or below.28 While a common refrain among banks is that 
online banking and ATMs are appropriate alternative service vehicles, the fact 
that over half of New Yorkers live in LMI areas signals that there is a market that 
is eager for access to mainstream financial services and a physical bank branch.   
As table 22 illustrates, bank branch siting in New York City is uneven. While sav-
ings banks tend to serve neighborhoods better across many activities due to their 
more localized focus, in the case of branching, larger commercial retail banks have 
stronger branch networks due in larger part to their most expansive footprints. Of 
the ten commercial banks we analyzed, 60% of the banks (6 out of 10) met the 25% 
branching threshold in 2009. On the contrary, of the eight savings institutions we 
examined, only three banks (37.5%) met or exceeded the threshold.
 
That being said, several savings banks have established a strong branch presence 
in low- and moderate-income tracts.  For example, out of a total of eight branches 
serving New York City, Carver Bank maintains five branches (62.5%) in low-and 
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   ANHD would like to 
see 25% of a bank’s 
total branches in the 
city to be located in 
LMI neighborhoods
27  More Banks in New York City: (But Only 
for Some)”. Prepared by the Office of Former 
Congressman Anthony D. Weiner. Available at: 
http://www.weiner.house.gov/news_display.
aspx?id=1640  . 
28  U.S. Census Bureau. Community Develop-
ment Block Grant Census Tract Eligibility. 
2007. Available at: http://www.nyc.gov/html/
dcp/download/resource/2000cdbgtractreport.
xls 
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moderate-income tracts. Similarly, Apple Bank, which op-
erates a total of 34 branches in the city has 19 branches 
(56%) located in low-and moderate-income tracts. Carver 
and Apple Bank’s commitment to equitable branching is 
encouraging.  
Unfortunately, this commitment is not shared by their peer 
institutions. New York Community Bank was the most ac-
tive institution in terms of branch openings and closings in 
2009. NYCB opened 20 branches between 2008 and 2009, 
and to its credit, eight of those new branches were in mod-
erate-income census tracts. However, the bank also closed 
one of its two branches in low-income tracts. NYCB contin-
ues to fall short of ANHD’s threshold for equitable branch-
ing as just 19.5% of the bank’s branches are located in LMI 
neighborhoods. 
Astoria Bank, despite a remarkable 173% increase in de-
posits in 2009, did not open a single branch in low- and 
moderate-income tracts in 2009 and has no branches in 
low-income neighborhoods among its 85 branches.  
Again, commercial banks tend to be much stronger when it 
comes to providing retail financial services to working class 
New Yorkers. JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citibank, 
HSBC, Capital One, and Banco Popular all surpassed the 
25% threshold. Banco Popular continues to lead the pack 
with 68.8% of its total branches in LMI communities. 
Of the four commercial banks that failed to meet ANHD’s 
25% threshold, Wells Fargo had the smallest percentage of 
banks in LMI communities. Just 7.7% of the bank’s branch-
es are sited in low- and moderate-income areas. TD Bank, 
despite posting a 31.5% increase in deposits, did not open 
a single branch in low-and moderate-income tracts and 
closed six branches overall. 
An equally important benchmark related to branch siting 
is that at least 10 percent of a bank’s total branches be lo-
cated in low-income neighborhoods. In the two year period, 
the total number of branches operated by the 16 responding 
banks increased by 2% (from 1,287 branches to 1,314). Of 
the 27 branches that opened, only one (3.7%) is located in a 
low-income community. Thus, the overall share of branches 
Table 22.
PERCENTAGE OF BRANCHES IN LOW- OR 
MODERATE-INCOME TRACTS  2009
Banco Popular
Bank of America
JPMorgan 
Chase
68.8%
33%
30.03%
1
2
3
Carver
Apple Bank
75%
55.9%
1
2
SAVINGS BANKS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
Ridgewood 26.9%1
Table 23.
PERCENTAGE OF BRANCHES IN  
LOW INCOME TRACTS  2009
Banco Popular
JPMorgan Chase
M&T Bank
31.3%
9.8%
7.7%
1
2
3
Carver
Apple Bank
62.5%
17.6%
1
2
SAVINGS BANKS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
Sovereign/  
Santender
1.4%3
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fell by almost 1% between 2008 and 2009. Although this may not seem like a substantial 
decrease, it is a disturbing trend and one that we are very concerned about.
Indeed, measured against the 10% benchmark, the majority of New York City banks are 
underperforming. In fact, of the 13 reporting banks, only two banks have met this thresh-
old. JPMorgan Chase exceeded the 10% threshold in 2008, but fell short in 2009 since 
only one of its 30 new branches was located in a low-income tract, which resulted in a 
decrease in its overall share.  Astoria Federal Savings and Ridgewood Savings do not have 
a single branch in a low-income tract and several others including Wells Fargo, Valley Na-
tional, M&T, Sovereign, and Signature have only a single branch. Table 23 details the banks 
that best serve low-income neighborhoods in terms of having a physical presence in the 
community.
The weak branch penetration in low-income neighborhoods is problematic as the lack of 
access to financial services means banks are failing to serve the convenience and needs of 
local residents. Furthermore, it also enables the existence of predatory lenders, and check 
cashing businesses and other unregulated actors to take advantage of the service gap, prey 
on working class residents and charge exorbitant fees. 
Yet a physical branch is just one component of ensuring residents have access to financial 
services.  Banks must also offer and market products that respond to the credit needs 
of working class New Yorkers. Former Congressman Weiner’s study says, “the fundamen-
tal mismatch between current financial products offered and consumer transactional 
needs—getting cash, paying bills, and buying goods—appears to be the major determinate 
in whether and how individuals with low incomes use mainstream financial institutions.” 
There continues to be great disparity in bank access between lower income individuals 
and wealthier residents. Thus, it is also essential that banks focus on creating and market-
ing products that also respond to the needs of low and moderate-income customers’ needs.
STAFFING
It has been ANHD’s experience that the banks with the most effective CRA programs re-
flect a broad institutional commitment to CRA, which begins with leadership that is knowl-
edgeable about, engaged in, and committed to a bank’s CRA programs. In addition to com-
mitted leadership, strong CRA programs require the bank to have adequate levels of staff 
with appropriate expertise dedicated to each of its local markets. In terms of staff dedicated 
to reinvestment activities, we saw the most significant increases in overall CRA staffing 
and CRA staff located in New York City. 
Overall, staff supporting CRA activity jumped from 29 to 48—a 64% jump from the previ-
ous year.  However, just three banks were responsible for this growth: Bank of America, 
TD Bank and Bank of New York Mellon. Of the 19 new positions added across New York 
City, 14 were at Bank of America and four were at BONY Mellon.  The vast majority of 
these hires are located in New York City and hopefully dedicated to serving the city’s credit 
needs. 
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Two institutions reduced the number of CRA staff serving New York City. Of the commer-
cial banks, M&T Bank reduced CRA staff located in New York City by one, a decrease of 
33%. Of the savings banks, Astoria Bank reduced its two person CRA team by 50% result-
ing in only one staff person overseeing CRA activity in New York City. Thus, despite these 
minor shifts, it is evident that most banks doing business in New York City did not see 
meaningful changes in the number of staff devoted to CRA purposes.  
Unlike the stability that characterized CRA staffing patterns between 2008 and 2009 in 
New York City, community development staffing was much more volatile. Overall, com-
munity development staffing increased by just two people (+2.9%), yet specific institutions 
saw much more drastic changes.  
Of the commercial banks, Bank of America had the most significant increases in commu-
nity development lending staff, which were similar to its CRA staff gains outlined above. 
Bank of America added six members to its community development staff, an impressive 
75% increase. Five of these six new community development bankers are located in New 
York City. Although Bank of America should be applauded for ramping up their CRA and 
community development staff, it should be noted that Bank of America had some of the 
largest reductions in community development lending, as highlighted below.  
Citi and Capital One also enhanced their community development staffing, hiring three 
and two new people respectively. None of the city’s savings bank added community 
development staff.  
On the flip side, of the commercial banks, JPMorgan Chase cut five staff members, a 
10.9% reduction in community development staff; Banco Popular lost three staff, a 50% 
reduction; and M&T lost two staff members leaving the bank with only one communi-
ty development officer. Of the savings banks, Astoria Bank again saw the most signifi-
cant reductions in staff as it lost both of its community development bankers. Of the 
wholesale banks, Bank of New York Mellon decreased its community development staff 
by a third, from six bankers to four, which surely offsets the gains the bank made in 
CRA staffing.
We believe that the key to successful lending requires understanding local communities 
and thus, banks should always maintain a strong staff and physical presence in each 
neighborhood that they serve. As the footprint of a bank’s service area expands due to 
mergers and acquisitions, its staff is stretched to cover new geographies, often with-
out increased resources. It is only natural that this leads to a situation where staff has 
grown increasingly distant from the local community and less knowledgeable about lo-
cal credit needs and resources including public affordable housing and community devel-
opment programs. This has been one of the most troubling trends identified by ANHD’s 
members. 
That being said, some institutions such as Capital One have built a strong team that is 
rooted in New York City. As part of a panel discussion titled “CRA: How to Ensure Lo-
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cal Accountability” that took place during ANHD’s 2011 Annual Conference, Doro-
thy Broadman, Managing Vice President of Community Development Banking, said, “At 
Capital One, we have found that the key strategy for responding to local credit needs 
is to have staff regularly meet with nonprofits and public sector staff to ensure a deep 
and current understanding of trends and priorities.  This approach promotes our effec-
tive engagement in critical issues and activities.” ANHD member groups have reported a 
highly productive working relationship with Capital One’s community development staff 
and consistently characterize them as a leader in doing the deals we care about.  Further-
more, Capital One, from its leadership on down, continues to care about the creation of 
community-responsive housing and economic development policy, which is evident in its 
staff participation on local Boards of Directors as well as national forums and conferences. 
In addition to strong quantitative performance, it is clear that this locally-focused, inten-
sive approach is responsible for helping Capital One achieve the top spot in ANHD’s 2011 
Ranking of New York City Banks. 
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ANHD has chosen to rank New York City’s banks in an attempt to demonstrate which 
banks consistently seek to meet our community’s credit needs, not to characterize them 
as either “good” or “bad.” Because we are analyzing performance at a moment in time, the 
rankings are meant to provide a snapshot of how well each of the city’s banks served the 
credit needs of LMI households and neighborhoods compared to their peers in 2008 and 
2009. As mentioned above, ANHD compiled data on 46 different reinvestment activities 
including branching, staffing, multi-family lending, community development 
lending, CRA-qualified investment, home purchase loans, and philanthropy. 
The rankings are based on fifteen indicators that represent core reinvestment 
activities and those areas where the most data was provided by the banks. As 
the accompanying chart and narrative illustrate, there are few banks that rank 
consistently near the top or bottom. Rather, most banks seem to excel in some 
areas and lag in others. It is our hope that these rankings, by assessing each 
institution compared to its peers, encourage banks to commit to year-over-
year improvement. 
It is our expectation that banks are committed to expanding the volume of 
these activities on a year-over-year basis and improving the marketing and 
delivery mechanisms to ensure low- and moderate-income communities are 
well served. Unfortunately, out of the 18 banks that we examined in both 2008 
and 2009, every one retrenched in at least one area. These reductions are high-
lighted in red in Appendix A. 
ANHD accounted for year-over-year performance in these rankings. While we 
did not weight increases or decreases per se, since performance is assessed 
relative to their peers, if a particular institution experienced a large change, it is likely 
that their ranking for that indicator also changed. For instance, Bank of America’s rank-
ing drastically fell from #1 to one of the lowest possible rankings—#8—over the two-year 
period due in large part to the bank’s enormous drop-off in multi-family and community 
OVERALL RANKINGS:  
Capital One Climbs To Top Spot
PART II:
    While most 
banks authorized 
overall reductions 
in reinvestment 
activities in NYC, 
a few banks, in-
cluding Capital 
One, maintained 
a steady response 
to local credit  
and investment 
needs.
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development lending. As Appendix A illustrates, between 2008 and 2009, Bank of America 
authorized a 73.5% decrease in the number of multi-family loans in low-and moderate-in-
come tracts and a 74.4% cut in the amount of dollars dedicated to community development 
lending. ANHD feels strongly that it is important to provide incentives that encourage 
banks to better serve working class populations as well as think creatively about how to 
leverage their resources to maximize public benefit.  
There are a few banks who have maintained a steady responsiveness to local credit and 
investment needs.  
One bank that clearly led the pack in 2009 was Capital One, coming in at #1 in overall rank. 
Over the years, Capital One has emerged as a committed partner in economic and hous-
ing development, especially in low-and moderate-income neighborhoods. In 2007, Capital 
One had an average rank of #5 among commercial banks. In 2008, Capital One jumped 
from #5 to #2, trailblazing ahead most of its peer institutions. The success of Capital One 
comes from its leadership on down. Not only does Capital One have 23 bankers dedicated 
to CRA and community development activity, all 23 bankers are located in New York City. 
Furthermore, while most institutions were reducing community development lending and 
CRA-qualified investments, Capital One was aggressively ramping up, resulting in a 273% 
increase in affordable housing lending, from $40 million in 2008 to $150 million in 2009. In 
addition, Capital One also markedly increased CRA-qualified investments by 102.6%, from 
$113 million in 2008 to $229 million in 2009. 
M&T Bank too has maintained a consistent rank as one of the top three in several core 
indicators since 2007. Of commercial banks, M&T Bank has been ranked #1 three years 
in a row with the highest level of deposits dedicated to philanthropy in New York City. In 
addition, M&T has also consistently maintained a high rank in home purchase lending to 
low-and moderate-income borrowers. 2009 was no exception and M&T Bank increased the 
number of home purchase loans to LMI borrowers by 78%.
While we applaud M&T Bank for their commitment to providing philanthropic support, 
the bank is weak in some areas too. For the past three years, M&T Bank consistently has 
been ranked one of the lowest in terms of the percentage of branches located in LMI tracts. 
Indeed, M&T has only 15.4% of its branches in LMI neighborhoods and not a single branch 
in a low-income neighborhood.  
In 2009, Carver Savings Bank ranked #1 overall amongst savings banks. Carver ranked in 
the top two for all of the indicators it reported on with the exception of multi-family loans 
in low-and moderate-income tracts where it ranked 5th out of 6 banks. It should be noted 
that 2009 was the first year that ANHD requested information from Carver regarding the 
bank’s CRA-related activities. While it is outside of the scope of the report, Carver Savings 
Bank has faced challenges, however, based on our assessment, these issues are not con-
nected to lending and investments in low-and moderate-income communities.
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Of the wholesale banks, Deutsche Bank has exhibited consistent dedication to bank re-
investment. For three consecutive years, Deutsche Bank has achieved a #1 or #2 over-
all rank amongst wholesale banks. In 2009, Deutsche Bank ranked #1 in all categories 
with the exception of percent of deposits to CRA qualified investments, where the bank 
ranked #3 out of 4 banks. 
It should be noted that while some institutions near the top or bottom of the rankings 
scored consistently high or low, the performance of others was quite uneven. For ex-
ample, in 2009, Banco Popular ranked #2 overall and scored #1 in several categories such 
as the percentage of branches in LMI neighborhoods, the percentage of community de-
velopment staffing located in New York City and the percentage of multi-family loans in 
LMI tracts. At the same time, the bank had the second worst record in terms of how much 
of its total deposits were dedicated to philanthropy. 
Likewise, New York Community Bank secured one of the top rankings in 2009 based on 
the strength of its home purchase lending to low-and moderate-income borrowers, CRA-
qualified investments as a percentage of total deposits, grantmaking that supported the 
creation of affordable housing and a high percentage of deposits dedicated to philan-
thropy. Yet, the bank also ranks four out of 5 savings banks for multi-family lending in 
low-and moderate-income tracts. Additionally, the bank has the most units in a state of 
physical and fiscal distress of any lender doing business in the five boroughs. New York 
Community Bank’s rank would have likely slipped drastically had the number of overlev-
eraged and distressed properties in a lenders portfolio been considered in the rankings. 
Signature Bank ranked #4 in 2007 and improved its ranking to #3 in 2008. However in 
2009, Signature Bank ranked the lowest amongst peer savings institutions, coming in at 
#8. One of the reasons for this significant decline could be attributed to the fact that Sig-
nature Bank did not provide a complete response to our information request. Signature 
Bank responded to only 4 out of 46 data points, the lowest response of any institution. 
However, it should be noted that of the information Signature did provide, the news was 
bad. Specifically, Signature Bank reduced home purchase lending by 62% from the previ-
ous year.
Another savings bank whose performance fluctuated in 2009 was Apple Bank for Sav-
ings. In 2007 and 2008, Apple Bank for Savings was one of the highest ranking savings 
banks, leading by example with overall rankings of #2 and #1 respectively. In 2009, Apple 
Bank for Savings fell a few spots to #4. A key area where Apple Bank for Savings expe-
rienced a significant decline was in CRA-qualified investments. In 2009, Apple Bank’s 
CRA-qualified investments dropped by 92% and CRA-qualified investments as a percent 
of total deposits also fell by 91.34%.
Although there are numerous banks who continue to be responsive partners, as a whole 
ANHD is disappointed with the direction the banking industry has taken related to serv-
ing low- and moderate-income populations in New York City. In our experience, there are 
several commercial banks that consistently underperform relative to their peers. Given 
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that commercial banks have a stronger presence in New York City and higher deposits 
than savings institutions, this level of disregard for community needs is unacceptable. 
For example, Valley National Bank has consistently ranked in the bottom two for the past 
three years, and ranked last in 2009.  While it should be noted that Valley National Bank 
did not submit a complete response to our request for information, the bank ranked near 
the bottom for the three indicators for which they did supply information.
In addition to Valley National Bank’s poor overall ranking, HSBC and TD Bank also have 
overall weak performances over the past several years. HSBC has maintained a below 
average ranking three years in a row, ranking in the bottom third since 2007. While HSBC 
jumped one place to #7 in 2009, overall, the bank fared poorly in several indicators. Spe-
cifically, HSBC had one of the lowest amounts of deposits dedicated to philanthropy, 
with a paltry .004% dedicated to grantmaking, second worst to Banco Popular. Despite 
HSBC’s poor overall ranking, we are encouraged by signs of improvement in a few indi-
cators. For example, the bank increased grantmaking to support the creation of afford-
able housing by 20%.
TD Bank retrenched in 2009 and ranked second lowest overall to Valley National Bank. 
While there were a few improvements, TD Bank for the most part performed worse in 
2009. For example, although TD Bank was once the leader—ranking #1 in 2007 and 2008 
in total deposits dedicated to CRA-qualified investments—the bank slipped to #4 in 2009. 
In fact, TD reduced the percent of deposits to CRA- qualified investments by 50%. Also 
discouraging was that in 2009, TD Bank reduced multi-family lending in low-and mod-
erate-income tracts by nearly 74%, pushing down their #3 ranking in 2008 to #8 in 2009.
As far as saving banks, Astoria Bank experienced dramatic declines in CRA-related ac-
tivity in 2009. For example, over the past three years, Astoria Bank has not improved its 
branch presence in low-and moderate-income neighborhoods, and does not have a single 
branch in a low-income neighborhood.  Furthermore, in 2009 Astoria Bank zeroed out 
community development staff and maintained only one staff person dedicated to CRA 
related activity in New York City. 
In terms of wholesale banks, Bank of New York Mellon experienced the sharpest drop 
in overall rankings among the wholesale banks. Once a leader, Bank of New York Mel-
lon slipped from the #1 spot which it held for two consecutive years to last place in 2009. 
Again, the area with the most substantial decline was in CRA-qualified investments. In 
2009, Bank of New York Mellon’s CRA-qualified investments fell by a staggering 466.89%. 
This level of reduction is distressing given that from 2007-2008, the bank increased CRA-
qualified investments by nearly the same amount. This trend is alarming given that CRA-
qualified investments are critical to meeting the credit and investment needs of low-and 
moderate-income neighborhoods.
Finally, there are a few institutions whose record can best be described as incomplete. For 
example, Wells Fargo/Wachovia has made steady improvements year-over-year, moving 
from #10 in 2007 to #9 in 2008 and making a leap to #6 in 2009. What is unclear is if this 
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steady improvement is an indication that the bank is intent on expanding both its retail 
presence as well as its commitment to reinvestment, or if the bank is benefiting from a 
weaker performance amongst its peers. Indeed, most of our members reported that the 
bank is not yet a player in the New York City market.  And if Wells Fargo/Wachovia is 
indeed serious about being a factor here, zeroing out its community development lending 
in 2009 sends an odd message. 
Given the experience of our 99 members, it would be surprising if the banks’ 2010 num-
bers were more encouraging. As Part III will explain, numerous steps must be taken 
in both the immediate and intermediate terms to reverse these trends and ensure the 
city’s banking partners renew their commitment to meeting their CRA obligations in a 
meaningful way.  
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RANKING OF REGIONAL SAVINGS BANKS
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ANHD, like many in the community development sector, believes there are imme-
diate and intermediate steps that can be taken to strengthen and expand the CRA 
so it continues to catalyze community development and other bank reinvestment 
activities.29 These steps include legislative and regulatory actions at both the feder-
al and local levels. Indeed, given CRA’s centrality to ensuring financial institutions 
are committed to helping secure the health and vitality of our neighborhoods, all 
options must be pursued.   
Most critical is the need to strengthen the enforcement underpinnings of CRA 
by creating more leverage for community engagement and incentivizing banks to 
seek the highest CRA rating. This can be achieved through local CRA ordinances, 
which enable greater public engagement or placing greater emphasis on public 
input during the development of local CRA plans and performance evaluations. 
Additionally, banks, regulators, and community advocates must consider the out-
comes of a financial institution’s reinvestment activities and not just the number 
and dollar amount. Indeed, ANHD believes the stability and profitability of these 
activities and the long-term financial and economic health of the community are 
inherently linked. We believe the actions detailed below would go a long way to 
reverse the negative trends outlined in Part I and ensure banks dedicate a mean-
ingful amount of resources to lending, investment and services in New York City. 
In the short term, ANHD believes local strategies and federal regulatory reform 
present the best opportunities for reversing the negative trends discussed in the 
report. Specifically, ANHD seeks to: 
1. Pass a Local “Responsible Banking” Ordinance
Although ANHD is optimistic that both regulatory and legislative fixes at the fed-
eral level will move forward in a timely fashion, we are also mindful of New York 
RECOMMENDATIONS:   
Need For Local CRA Tools  
and Regulatory Reform
PART III:
29 December 15, 2009, Letter to the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council. 
Signed by 19 institutions including tax credit 
syndicators, community development interme-
diaries, lenders and financial institutions, and 
advocacy organizations. Letter available at: 
http://www.enterprisecommunity.org/pub-
lic_policy/documents/cra_letter_to_ffiec.pdf 
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City’s ability to initiate changes through the local legislative process. Cities across the na-
tion including Cleveland, Los Angeles and Philadelphia have undertaken similar strategies 
with great success. Indeed, all three cities have either introduced or passed ordinances that 
require banks to submit annual reports with the city that detail the programs and products 
they will offer to help meet the city’s credit needs. The cities then evaluate the banks per-
formance based on these reports and reward performing institutions with deposits, city 
contracts, and pension funds. Cleveland and Philadelphia, the two cities that have enacted 
these ordinances, have found the incentives to be sufficient for encouraging banks to de-
velop local plans and create comprehensive community development programs. 
ANHD is proposing the creation of a “Responsible Banking” ordinance for New York City 
with the following structure:
•  Focus on those banks that are eligible to provide “depository services” to the city.
•	 Rank banks according to submission of an annual “strategic plan,” which details 
how they plan to meet the credit needs of local communities as well as an annual 
“progress report” that states the number and dollar amount of loans, investments, 
and services provided by the bank.  
•  Require the city to compile and publicly disseminate the banks’ strategic plans 
and progress reports so elected officials and community groups can engage with 
financial institutions about local credit needs. 
•  Encourage the city to do business with those banks that are the most responsive 
partners in meeting local credit needs. 
We believe that a New York City Responsible Banking ordinance would create a tool for lo-
cal influence on the community investment practices of our banking institutions, and give 
the City Council, the City of New York, and engaged citizens in communities throughout 
the city a powerful mechanism to provide input related to our credit needs that would help 
ensure local oversight. 
2. Strengthen the regulatory system by encouraging regulators to tailor assessment criteria to 
the local performance context, place more emphasis on community development, and develop 
evaluation criteria that considers the quantity and quality of a bank’s lending, investment, and 
services.
ANHD recognizes that many banks have tailored their business models in such a way that 
makes it difficult for them to provide certain products or engage in the full range of CRA-
related activities. That being said, it is ANHD’s belief that for the largest banks, it would be 
hard to justify not providing a product or program that impacts such a large segment of the 
assessment area’s residents and neighborhoods. In New York City, this means that lending 
and investment supporting the creation and preservation of multi-family properties and 
community development activities would receive greater weight. 
Indeed, community development loans and investment are central to building strong neigh-
borhoods and supporting the work of CDCs, but currently count only for extra credit. These 
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activities must receive additional credit to achieve parity with home purchase and small 
business lending, especially in cities like New York where the housing stock is comprised 
mostly of multi-family rental properties. In the rare case where banks cannot be induced to 
provide the full range of essential products, the banks should be required to demonstrate 
how they are meeting their obligations in other ways.
Furthermore, it is clear that performance assessments have become increasingly volume 
driven. This gives an unfair advantage to the largest institutions and leads banks to support 
cookie cutter deals rather than develop innovative products and programs. Regrettably, it 
may also reward banks for engaging in activities that have had a negative impact on com-
munities. For example, in New York City, it is likely that bank that underwrote “Predatory 
Equity”-backed deals received CRA credit for loans that have displaced low- and moder-
ate-income families and de-stabilized neighborhoods. To our dismay, rather than correcting 
their practices of predatory lending, certain institutions, like New York Community Bank, 
have engaged in fire sales of distressed assets to other speculative buyers who do not have 
the best interests of tenants in mind.  When ANHD brought these overleveraged loans to 
both federal and state regulators, it became clear they did not have the tools to encourage 
or require the banks to dispose of the assets responsibly. 
Therefore, ANHD believes examinations must move beyond simply rewarding dollar 
and unit volumes, and actually determine which activities have had a positive impact on 
strengthening communities. For example, credit enhancements that enable community de-
velopment financing, such as letters of credit, should be given equal or near equal weight 
to loans and investments. Overall, regulations should be reworked to ensure exams are not 
merely checklists that are driven by volume, but the qualitative impact as well. 
3. Protect the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) as a strong, independent advocate 
for consumers.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Over the past several months, several bills 
have been introduced in the House of Representatives that seek to weaken the CFPB. To 
ensure the CFPB is a strong advocate for consumers, several key characteristics must be 
preserved. First, the CFPB must continue to remain within the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Reserve Board and not transferred to the Department of Treasury. Second, funding for the 
CFPB must come from automatic transfers from the Federal Reserve Board and not subject 
to annual Congressional appropriations. Finally, the CFPB must be led by a single director, 
not a multi-person commission, which will delay policy and decision making. In all, these 
steps should help ensure consumers have comprehensible information to make respon-
sible financial decisions, gain access to financial services, and are protected from abuse, 
unfairness, deception, and discrimination.
4. Restore Critical Housing Counseling Funding
Housing counseling is a critical and much-needed service provided to home buyers in all 
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economic segments, particularly to low-and moderate-income borrowers. Last year, HUD- 
approved housing counseling agencies provided counseling and education services to over 
3 million families nationwide. HUD counselors were successful in preventing mortgage de-
linquency for 1.4 million households and helping 410,000 avoid foreclosure. However, in FY 
2011, HUD certified housing counselors were hit terribly hard as a result of federal budget 
cuts to the program.  Despite record demand for these essential services, funds for housing 
counselors were zeroed out in FY 2011. Housing counseling is critical given that the hous-
ing crisis is far from over, wreaking havoc on cities and counties across the country. It is 
imperative that counseling funds are restored to the fullest extent in FY 2012.
In the longer term, Congress must pass CRA Modernization legislation that would enhance 
and expand the law to reflect the current structure of the financial industry.
5. Enact CRA Modernization
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) has been one of the most important laws for 
building wealth and revitalizing neighborhoods since its passage in 1977. However, the fi-
nancial services sector has changed dramatically in the three decades since and the law has 
not been altered to reflect the shifts in how banks do business and other trends in the lend-
ing industry. In order to ensure the CRA remains an effective law and meets the on-going 
needs of LMI borrowers and communities, modernization legislation needs to be passed. 
 
Legislation introduced in the 111th Congress, including H.R. 1479, the Community Rein-
vestment Modernization Act, and H.R. 6334, the American Community Investment Reform 
Act would make many important changes. These bills would:
• Expand geographical areas for where a bank is examined to include not only 
where it has branches, but also where it makes loans through brokers and non-
branch entities. 
• Combat grade inflation through the requirement of federal banking agencies to 
publish preliminary CRA exams for review and public comment before finalizing 
CRA ratings. Additionally, more ratings would be added to reflect gradations in 
performance, which are clearly absent under the current system where 98 percent 
of banks receive a passing grade. These changes would help hold banks more ac-
countable. 
• Apply CRA to a variety of non-bank institutions, require federal regulatory agen-
cies to hold more public hearings and meetings when banks merge, enhance 
accountability through data disclosure and introducing more publicly available 
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ratings, address racial disparities in lending by requiring CRA exams to explicitly 
consider lending and services to minorities in addition to LMI communities, and 
bolster the accountability of banks to all communities, among other things. Similar 
legislation must be introduced and passed in the 112th Congress. 
Additionally, ANHD recommends expanding data disclosure requirements to include com-
munity development activities and create a new community development test for large 
banks. The latter recommendation is especially important as it would encourage banks to 
think more comprehensively about the range of products and policies it needs to best fulfill 
its CRA obligations. The current community development test for a wholesale bank could 
be a model that is adapted for this purpose.  
CONCLUSION
Our ability to help working class families build wealth and ensure the vitality of our neigh-
borhoods is dependent on partnerships with banks, local government, community institu-
tions and grassroots leaders. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) is a valuable tool, 
which used responsibly helps build wealth and revitalize neighborhoods across the coun-
try. It is imperative that CRA remains effective and that banks meet the ongoing needs of 
low-and moderate-income communities. 
The data and anecdotal evidence presented in this report demonstrates the deep need, now 
more than ever, for banks to reaffirm their commitment to providing loans, investments 
and financial services that are responsible and responsive to local needs. 
In order to meet this objective, it is our continued mission to work to create and maintain 
safe, decent neighborhoods for New Yorkers across all five boroughs and of all income 
levels.
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2009 ALL # Of Banks  
Reporting In  
2009
Data Points Provided
Percent Completeness
Tier 1 Capital
Total Deposits (National)
Total Deposits NYC 
Total NYC Branches
Low-Income (LI) Branches
Mod. Income (MI) Branches
% in LMI Census Tracts
2009 STATISTICS FOR 20  
OF NYC’S LARGEST BANKS
APPENDIX B:
% in LI Census Tracts
% in MI Census Tracts
CD Staff located in NYC
CD Staff Serving NY
Staff supporting CRA Activity
CRA Staff Located in NYC
% CD Staffing located in NYC
27
58.70%
$474.34 
$2,990.71 
$521.66 
1431
85
226
26.55%
5.94%
15.79%
21 banks
21 banks
20 banks
19 banks
19 banks
20 banks
15 banks
15 banks
17 banks
14 banks
14 banks
138
114
89
76.5
84.38%
16 banks
16 banks
14 banks
14 banks
16 banks
BRANCHES & DEPOSITS (billions)
STAFFING
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT  LENDING
CD Lending (# Loans)
CD Lending (in $)
CD Loans to Nonprofits (#)
CD Loans to Nonprofits ($)
Affordable Housing Loans (#)
308
$1,474.30
180
$520.19 
76
17 banks
17 banks
15 banks
14 banks
12 banks
 A P P E N D I X  B
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COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT  LENDING (continued)
MULTI FAMILY LENDING  (billions)
MORTGAGE LENDING / MODIFICATION (millions)
Affordable Housing Loans ($)
Affordable Housing to NFPs
% CD Lending to AH ($)
% CD Loans to NFPs (#)
CD Lending as % of Deposits
$755.85
17
448.95%
58.44%
0.58%
975
$2,040.65
387
$1,307.88
39.69%
16 banks
17 banks
16 banks
15 banks
16 banks
12 banks
5 banks
12 banks
11 banks
17 banks
MF Lending (# Loans)
MF Lending (in $)
MF Lending in LMI tracts (#)
MF Lending in LMI tracts ($)
% Loans in LMI (#)
Home Purchase Loans (#)
Home Purchase Loans ($)
HPLs to LI borrowers (#)
HPLs to LI borrowers ($)
HPLs to MI borrowers (#)
HPLs to MI borrowers ($)
% of Loans to LMI Borrowers (#)
% of loans to LI Borrowers (#)
Loans Eligible for Trial Mod (#)
Eligible loans Granted a Trial (#)
Eligible loans Granted a Trial (%)
Loans Eligible for Perm Mod (#)
Eligible loans Granted a Perm Mod (#)
Perm Mods as % of Eligible (%)
Eligible for Perm HAMP (#)
HAMP Perm Modifications (#)
HAMP % of Trial Modifications resulting 
in Permanent Mod
LMI HPLS as % of Deposits
18,456
$6,193.34 
236
$49.94 
1524
$238.81 
14.45%
1.28%
389
4
1.03%
682
141
12.61%
24,089
9.26%
0.61%
17 banks
17 banks
14 banks
13 banks
14 banks
14 banks
14 banks
14 banks
2 banks
2 banks
2 banks
5 banks
6 banks
5 banks
4 banks
4 banks
13 banks
2009 ALL # Of Banks  
Reporting In  
2009
STATISTICS FOR 20 OF NYC’S LARGEST BANKS  2009
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CRA-ELIGIBLE INVESTMENTS  (millions)
2009 ALL # Of Banks  
Reporting In  
2009
CRA Qualified Investments (#)
CRA Qualified Investments ($)
LIHTC (#)
LIHTC ($)
LIHTC (%)
NMTC ($)(m)
NMTC (#)
CRA Qualified Investments to NFPs ($)
CRA Qualified Investments to NFPs (#)
CRA-qualified investments  
as % of Total Deposits
PHILANTHROPY  (millions)
Total Philanthropic Giving (National)
CRA Eligible Grants in NYC (#, $)
Affordabe Housing CRA Grants (%)
% of Grants to NBOs
Citywide CRA Grants (#, $)
% of Deposits to Philanthropy
$180.14 
$40.09
26.75%
75.49%
$9.28
0.00042%
11 banks
18 banks
11 banks
8 banks
8 banks 
14 banks
170
$753.48
28
$343.70
34.33%
$126 
0
$233.78 
37 
0.14%
14 banks
16  banks
6 banks
9 banks
14 banks 
4 banks
2 banks
11 banks
11 banks
16 banks
STATISTICS FOR 20 OF NYC’S LARGEST BANKS  2009
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SAMPLE INFORMATION  
REQUEST LETTER
APPENDIX C:
August 10, 2010  
Dear ,
As you know, the Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development 
(ANHD) is a non-profit member organization of 98 neighborhood-based housing 
groups in New York City. Our members serve low- and moderate-income com-
munities and households throughout the five boroughs. Since the passage of the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in 1977, ANHD’s reinvestment advocacy has 
focused on identifying unmet credit needs as well as opportunities related to af-
fordable housing and community development in New York City. 
In this spirit, I am writing to submit our annual request for information concerning 
Bank’s’s CRA-related activities in New York City for calendar year 2009. We are es-
pecially interested in the bank’s community development lending, investment and 
services. We would like this information on the activities of Bank’s and all other 
subsidiaries and affiliates doing business in New York City.
While I would like to thank you in advance for sharing this important data, I also 
invite you to share additional information—either quantitative or qualitative—that 
you believe demonstrates Bank’s’s commitment to help meet the credit needs of 
working class New Yorkers. Indeed, we understand that every financial institu-
tion is unique and that numbers alone do not always capture all the bank’s CRA-
related efforts. This recognition is why one of ANHD’s “Reinvestment Principles” 
recommends that banks doing business in New York City develop and publish a 
local CRA strategic plan that describes the bank’s approach to reinvestment.
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DEVELOPMENT OF A LOCAL CRA PLAN
As noted above, we believe an effective CRA program needs to be locally-focused and 
flexible so as to meet changing community needs and priorities. In New York City, priori-
ties change from year to year, as new issues arise, and needs also differ among individual 
neighborhoods.  A bank should have a local CRA plan which responds to that reality.
Does Bank’s have a CRA plan for the five boroughs of New York City which reflects local 
needs and priorities and establishes concrete objectives and targets in the areas of CRA-
related lending, investment and services? If so, is this plan publically available? 
 
TIER ONE CAPITAL
We are requesting the following information concerning Bank’s’s Tier 1 Capital as of De-
cember 31, 2009: 
• Dollar amount of Tier 1 Capital
DEPOSITS AND BRANCH NETWORK
We are requesting the following information concerning Bank’s’s deposits and branches as 
of December 31, 2009: 
• Dollar amount of deposits in New York City
• Dollar amount of deposits nationally
• Number of bank branches within the five boroughs of New York City
• Number of NYC branches that were located in low-income census tracts
• Number of NYC branches that were located in moderate-income census tracts 
Additionally, please provide information on whether Bank’s opened or closed any branches 
in New York City in 2009. If so, please let us know how many of those branches were in low-
income tracts and how many were in moderate-income tracts.
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND CRA-RELATED STAFFING
We are requesting the following information concerning Bank’s’s staffing as of December 
31, 2009: 
• Number of community development lending staff serving the New York  
City market 
• Number of community development lending staff located in the city
• Number of staff supporting Bank’s’s CRA-related philanthropy in New York City 
• Number of staff who support CRA-related philanthropy that are located in the city
Additionally, does the bank have a centralized community development group dedicated to 
New York City and staffed by a senior executive? Please describe what steps the bank has 
taken to ensure community development staff have knowledge about the New York City 
market including public subsidy programs. Finally, does Bank’s have a community advi-
sory council or other vehicles to identify and respond to emerging needs in the City’s LMI 
neighborhoods?
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COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT LENDING 
We are requesting the following information concerning Bank’s’s community development 
lending in 2009: 
• Number of community development loans originated in NYC as a whole  
and by borough
• Dollar amount of community development loans originated in the city  
and by borough
• Number of community development loans made to non-profit  
sponsors / borrowers
• Dollar amount of community development loans made to non-profit  
sponsors / borrowers
• Number of community development loans for affordable housing
• Dollar amount of community development loans for affordable housing
 
MULTI-FAMILY LENDING
We are requesting the following information concerning Bank’s’s multi-family lending 
in 2009: 
• Number of multi-family loans originated in New York City as a whole and by 
borough
• Dollar amount of multi-family loans originated in the city and by borough  
• Number of multi-family loans for properties in low- and moderate-income (LMI) 
neighborhoods in the city as a whole and by borough
• Dollar amount of multi-family loans for properties in LMI neighborhoods in the 
city and by borough
HOME PURCHASE LENDING AND LOAN MODIFICATION
We are requesting the following information concerning Bank’s’s home purchase loans in 
New York City in 2009: 
• Number of home purchase loans originated in New York City
• Dollar amount of home purchase loans in the city
• Number of home purchase loans originated with low-income (LI) borrowers  
in the city
• Dollar amount of home purchase loans originated with LI borrowers in the city
• Number of home purchase loans made with moderate-income (MI) borrowers  
in the city 
• Dollar amount of home purchase loans originated with MI borrowers in the city
• Number of mortgage loans that were eligible for a trial loan modification
• Number of eligible loans that were granted a trial loan modification
• Percent of eligible loans that were granted a trial loan modification
• Number of mortgage loans that were eligible for a permanent modification
• Number of eligible loans that were granted a permanent loan modification
• Percent of eligible loans that were granted a permanent loan modification
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CRA-QUALIFIED INVESTMENT
For calendar year 2009, what were the: 
• Number of CRA-qualified investments made in New York City
• Dollar amount of CRA-qualified investments made in New York City
• Percent of these CRA-qualified investments that are Low Income Housing  
Tax Credits  
• Number of these CRA-qualified investments made with non-profit sponsors  
• Dollar amount of these CRA-qualified investments made with non-profit  
sponsors
PHILANTHROPY
We are requesting the following information concerning Bank’s’s philanthropy in 2009: 
• Dollar amount of CRA-eligible grants awarded nationally
• Dollar amount of CRA-eligible grants awarded in New York City and by borough 
• Dollar amount of CRA-eligible grants made to neighborhood-based community 
groups
• Dollar amount of CRA-eligible grants made to citywide organizations 
• Percent of CRA-eligible grants that were awarded for affordable housing
• Percent of CRA-eligible grants that were awarded for community development 
• Percent of CRA-eligible grants that were awarded for financial literacy
Does the bank have a competitive grant application process with well-defined procedures 
and priorities? Additionally, please provide information on the bank’s participation in lo-
cal strategic donor collaboratives or coalitions that seek to leverage and better coordinate 
community investments? Finally, what is the total CRA philanthropic budget for New York 
City for 2010?
INNOVATIVENESS
Please provide information on any products or loan programs offered by Bank’s that reflect 
flexible underwriting standards or loan terms thereby enabling the bank to reach borrow-
ers that you were previously not serving. Additionally, please describe how the bank has 
marketed this product to underserved populations.  
If you have any questions, do not hesitate to call me at (212) 747-1117 x17 or email me at 
benjamin.d@anhd.org. Please send the requested information to my attention at:
     
 Benjamin Dulchin, Executive Director
 ANHD
 50 Broad Street, Suite 1125
 New York, NY 10004
Thank you very much,
 
Benjamin Dulchin
Executive Director
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